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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is composed of two distinct parts. In the …rst one (chapter 2), I present an extension
of an entry model “à la Dixit”. I consider a setting in which the investment decisions of the
…rst mover might reveal information to a second entrant. In this context, I characterize the
…rst mover’s strategic behavior.
In the second part (chapters 3,4,5,6), I consider the issue of the governance form of strategic
alliances. That is, I study the way in which …rms organize their cooperative arrangements.
In chapter 3, there is a brief introduction to the topic. In chapters 4 and 5, I present two
theoretical models. In the …rst one, I employ an incomplete contracts setting and I analyze the
role of learning the partner’s know-how on the performances of two typical modes of organizing
strategic alliances, namely Joint Ventures and Contractual Agreements. The model of chapter
5 combines the tools and methods of two strands of economic literature: investment under
uncertainty and search theory. The main objective of the model is that of relating the form
of governance that partners choose for their alliance to the typology of the project undertaken
and to the characteristics of the sector in which the alliance takes place. The last chapter is
devoted to an empirical assessment of the topic. I test some of the predictions that can be
derived from the models of chapters 4 and 5 as well as those that have been put forward by
other theoretical studies dealing with the same issue.
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Chapter 2
Entry and Preemption When the
Competitor Can Wait and See1
2.1 Introduction
Market entry is a decision that typically involves uncertainty. Variables in question might be
production costs, demand conditions, the suitability of the supplied products to the consumers’
tastes or the level of competition that a …rm is going to experience. One strategy that a …rm
can use is to enter in a sequential way. It can start with a small scale and then increase it
if market conditions have been favorable. However, this behavior might reveal information.
Observing that a …rm is increasing the size of its investment, other companies can infer that
markets are pro…table and, therefore, they can follow the …rst entrant. That is, a sequential
entry pattern might induce other …rms to follow the leader.
In this chapter, I introduce these features in a simpli…ed version of an entry model “à la
Dixit” (1980). Two …rms (a …st and a second movers) decide about entry into two markets
of unknown but correlated pro…tability. The two …rms have common priors about the state of
the markets. The …rst mover can enter both markets at the same time or sequentially, that
is, it enters the …rst, observes the state of the markets and it conditions entry in the second
1This paper has bene…tted from the helpful suggestions and remarks of David Pérez-Castrillo,
Inés Macho-Stadler, Pierre Regibeau and Konrad Stahl.
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upon this new information. However, this latter choice reveals information to the competitor.
Choosing a wait and see strategy, the second entrant observes whether the …rst mover enters
the second market and therefore it infers the market conditions.
The explicit consideration that the …rst mover’s behavior might reveal information to the
competitor is the novel aspect of my analysis. Indeed, the literature about entry usually extends
the two-periods two-…rms Dixitmodel to allow for uncertainty but not for learning among …rms.2
In Somma (1999) and Brander and Spencer (1992), uncertainty resolves as time goes by. That
is, it is assumed that between the …rst and the second period both …rms learn the market
conditions. In McGahan (1993), uncertainty is resolved just after …rms have invested. This
author compares the equilibrium under two regimes. In the …rst, both …rms learn the market
conditions as soon as the …rst mover invests. In the second, it is only the investing …rm that
learns the state of demand. In this chapter, in a sense, I endogenize these two regimes. The
…rst mover decides whether to enter sequentially, revealing information to the competitor, or
to enter both markets at the same time to avoid any information disclosure.
Inferring information by observing the behavior of informed agents is an issue that has been
extensively addressed within contexts di¤erent from entry or investment decisions.3 Typically,
these models consider scenarios in which the link among agents is purely informational. That
is, each agent can learn valuable information by observing the behavior of the other players,
but her pay-o¤ does not depend on their actual choices. Each player would prefer the others to
move …rst in order to learn their private information, but once she decides to move, she will not
act in a strategic way since her pay-o¤ does not depend on what the others will do. However,
when uncertainty is related to variables that are speci…c to the …rm’s business, it is only the
observation of the behavior of companies belonging to the same industry that is relevant to
acquire information. In this case, the assumption that the …rm’s pay-o¤ is una¤ected by what
the other companies do is no longer acceptable.
Another strand of literature to which my paper is related is the so-called market experi-
mentation.4 In these studies, competing …rms, in order to improve their information about an
2Maggi (1996) considers a framework where the …rst and the second movers are endogenously determined.
However, he assumes that uncertainty resolves exogenously between the …rst and the second period.
3See, among others, Chamley and Gale (1994), Gul and Lundholm (1995).
4See Harrington (1995) and Mirman et al. (1994).
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unknown variable, distort their choices from the ones that maximize the short-run pro…ts. The
main di¤erence with my model relies on the nature of information. While I consider it as being
privately acquired, in the market experimentation literature information is public so that …rms
are always symmetrically informed.
As a reference, in section 3, I characterize the equilibrium of the game in a benchmark in
which the link among agents is purely informational. The second entrant can learn the state
of markets by observing the …rst mover’s behavior. However, the pay-o¤ of each …rm does not
depend on the other’s choices; that is, …rms are not rivals. In this context, there is no role for
strategic behavior and …rms face a simple trade-o¤ between higher potential pro…tability (enter
both markets as soon as possible) and additional information (enter markets sequentially or
play a wait and see strategy to observe the …rst mover’s behavior before acting).
In section 4, I analyze what changes when …rms are rivals. In particular, by comparing the
equilibrium outcome with the one obtained in the benchmark, I focus on the strategic behavior
of the …rst mover. This …rm tries to preempt or to postpone the entry of the competitor and
it knows that entering markets sequentially it reveals information, while entering them at the
same time it does not. When the priors are such that …rms believe that markets are likely to be
pro…table, then the …rst mover has no chance to preempt the competitor. In this case, the best
it can do is to enter markets sequentially, reveal information trying to delay the competitor’s
entry. Indeed, when information is going to be revealed, the second mover plays the wait
and see strategy and, therefore, di¤ers entry in any market until it has observed the complete
entry pattern of the …rst mover. On the contrary, when the priors are such that …rms believe
that markets are likely to be unpro…table, the …rst entrant strategically chooses to enter both
markets at the same time, reveal no information and preempt the competitor.
In section 5, I brie‡y consider the case of complementarities. That is, the case in which
revenues are higher when both …rms are simultaneously present in the same market. This time,
the …rst mover’s aim is to encourage the other …rm to enter as soon as possible. I …nd that the
…rst mover might strategically choose to enter both markets at the same time rather than enter
them sequentially. Indeed, this last strategy might induce the second …rm to play wait and see
and thus to postpone entry.
The model I present is better suited to scenarios in which …rms are deciding about entry into
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“new” and yet unknown markets. Indeed, the assumption that …rms have the same priors about
markets pro…tability seems to be more likely to be met in these circumstances. However, this
observation poses the question of whether in such cases it is sensible to assume a structure with
exogenous …rst and second movers. In section 6, I tackle this issue considering an extension of
the model. The question I address is when a …rst-second mover structure arises as an equilibrium
outcome. That is, if both …rms were free to move from the very beginning of the game, when
would it happen that one …rm enters as …rst and, some time later, the other follows? I …nd
that the results crucially depend on the level of competition among …rms and on the prior
probabilities. However, interestingly enough, when priors are su¢ciently good and competition
not too harsh, then, with respect to the benchmark, the fact that …rms are rivals increases the
likelihood that a …st-second mover structure arises in equilibrium.
2.2 The Model
I consider two …rms (…rm A and …rm B) that are deciding about entry into two markets. The
investment required is I for each of the two sites. This is paid at the entry time and it is
irreversible. Consumers’ tastes are uncertain but perfectly correlated between markets. Before
entering, …rms expect their products to suit the consumers’ tastes, s = 1 in both markets, with
probability p and not to, s = 0, with complementary probability (1 ¡ p) : At each period, if a
…rm is the only one active in the market it collects monopoly revenues. These are normalized to
s (1 ¡ ±) ; where ± 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor. When both …rms are simultaneously active in
the same market, then competition reduces the revenues that each …rm collects. The per-period
duopoly pro…ts that a …rm obtains in a market are s ((1 ¡ ±)¡ r) ; where r ¸ 0 is a reduced
form for the e¤ects of competition.5
I assume that once entered a market a …rm stays active forever.6 The present value of the
‡ow of revenues that it collects from the period of entry on is s in case of monopoly and it
5The form r ¸ 0 encompasses any kind of rivalry between the two …rms from Bertrand competition in
homogeneous goods (r = 1¡ ±) to the case of independent products (r = 0).
6This assumption might seem extreme when s = 0: Indeed, in this case, a …rm does not earn any revenue but
still it stays active in the market. However, one should think to s = 0 just as a simplifying assumption. When
the product does not suit the consumers’ tastes, then revenues are low. Therefore, no …rm would pay I to enter
a market, but once the investment is sunk is optimal no to exit.
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is s (1 ¡ R) in the duopoly case, where R = r1¡± : In expected terms these are p and p(1 ¡R)
respectively.
Clearly, when s = 0 entry in a market is not pro…table: the investment I has to be paid
and no revenues will be earned. On the contrary, I assume that when s = 1; entry is pro…table
regardless of whether the other …rm enters or not that market. In other words, in this case,
the ‡ow of revenues that a …rm earns from the period of entry on is always su¢cient to cover
I . That is:
1 ¡R ¸ I: (2.1)
For future reference, I de…ne R ´ 1 ¡ I so that condition (2.1) can be re-written as R · R:
I assume that (2.1) holds throughout the whole paper.
Firms just choose their entry patterns. Firm A moves in periods t = 1; 2; while B moves in
periods t = 2;3: Firm A can locate in the two markets at t = 1 and with the only knowledge of
the priors, p and (1 ¡ p). Alternatively, A can enter markets in sequence and take advantage
of the correlation of consumers’ tastes. In this case, at t = 1; it locates in one market; observes
s and, the next period, it conditions entry in the second upon this new information. The last
option is to enter no market at all.7
Formally, the same choices are available to B: However, this …rm can also take advantage
of the information that A’s behavior reveals. When, at t = 1; …rm A has entered only one
market, then, at t = 2; it decides whether to locate in the second having perfect knowledge of
s: Choosing to enter no market at t = 2; B observes A’s choice and it infers information about
s. In this case, I say that …rm B chooses to wait and see. The advantage of this strategy is
that …rm B will decide about entry with a better knowledge about markets’ pro…tability. The
disadvantage is that entry in any site is postponed till t = 3:
7Waiting for one period and then entering one or two markets is a dominated strategy for …rm A.
8
2.3 The Benchmark: Independent Firms
I consider a non-strategic framework in which …rms’ pay-o¤ are independent; that is, I consider
the case in which r = 0: Still, I assume s to be the same for the two …rms, so that B can infer
the market conditions when A enters markets in a sequential way.
In this setting, …rms face a trade-o¤ between higher potential pro…tability and additional
information. Entering the two markets as soon as it can, a …rm collects revenues from the
very beginning but it locates in both markets with the only knowledge of priors. The expected
pay-o¤ associated with this strategy is 2 (p¡ I) : Choosing a sequential entry pattern, a …rm
enters just one market and, the next period, it will enter the second if and only if it observes
s = 1: When choosing this strategy a …rm expects a pay-o¤ p¡ I + ±p (1 ¡ I) : Finally, for …rm
B, when A has located in one market and, therefore, it is going to reveal the true state of s at
t = 2, then by choosing to wait and see it postpones to collect revenues in both markets but it
decides about entry with perfect knowledge about s: The expected pay-o¤ associated with the
strategy wait and see is 2±p (1 ¡ I) :
Next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the game for the case under analysis:
Proposition 1 When r = 0 , then:
(i) A enters both markets at t = 1 and B enters both markets at t = 2 if p ¸ pbothr=0;
(ii) A enters markets sequentially and B chooses to wait and see if p 2 £pprer=0; pbothr=0 ¢;
(iii) no entry takes place if p < pprer=0.
The above proposition shows that when markets are likely to be pro…table (case i)), …rms
enter them as soon as they can. For intermediate values of p (case ii)) they prefer to collect
information. Firm A chooses a sequential pattern, while …rm B chooses to wait and see. When
the priors are so low that negative pro…ts are expected (case iii)), then no …rm enters any
market.
The bounds pbothr=0 and p
pre
r=0 in the statement of proposition 1 as well as all the other bounds
for p that I will use later are de…ned in the appendix.8
8The superscripts both; pre refer to the rivalry case. When p > pboth; …rm B prefers to enter both markets
as soon as it can and independently of A’s choices. When p < ppre; then …rm B is preempted when …rm …rm A
enters the two markets at the same time.
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2.4 Rival Firms
Under rivalry (r > 0), …rm A prefers …rm B not to enter or to postpone entry in the markets.
Consequently, when taking its decisions, …rm A has incentives to behave in a strategic way.
I start the analysis of the case in which r > 0 by characterizing the equilibrium of the
signaling game that takes place at t = 2 once A has entered one market:
2.4.1 The Signaling Game played at t = 2
Entering one market at t = 1; …rm A has observed the true state of consumers’ tastes. When
s = 0; it is a dominant strategy not to enter the remaining market. When s = 1; then A trades
o¤ two e¤ects. From condition (2.1), entry in the second market is per se pro…table. However,
this choice has also the e¤ect of revealing that s = 1 and, therefore, of attracting the competitor
in the markets when the latter chooses to wait and see. The optimal choice depends on the
level of rivalry. As I check in the appendix, there is a cut-o¤ value, Rharsh: 9If R · Rharsh;
then the bene…ts entering the second market are greater than the costs due to the increase in
rivalry. On the contrary, when R > Rharsh, the competition e¤ect is dominant.
I will say that rivalry is harsh when R > Rharsh; otherwise I will say that rivalry is not
harsh. Next two lemmas characterize the equilibrium of the signaling game for these two cases.
Given that it is dominant not to enter the second market when s = 0; I only characterize A’s
choices when s = 1. Moreover, I de…ne the equilibrium of signaling game as separating, semi-
separating or pooling depending on whether A enters, randomizes or does not enter the second
market once it has observed s = 1:
Lemma 1 When R · Rharsh, then the Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game played at
t = 2 once A has entered the …rst market is separating. In equilibrium, if s = 1 A enters the
second market; while B enters both markets at t = 2 if p ¸ pboth and it chooses to wait and see
if p < pboth : When waiting, …rm B updates its beliefs in this way: if A has entered the second
market, then B believes that s = 1 with probability 1; if A has not entered the second market,
then B believes that s = 0 with probability 1:
9The cut-o¤ value Rharsh as well as all the other bounds for R that I will use later are de…ned in the Appendix.
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When competition is not harsh, …rm A always separates thus revealing the true state of s:
When priors are high
¡
p ¸ pboth¢ ; then B enters both markets as soon as it can. When priors
are lower
¡
p < pboth
¢
; then B prefers to wait and see and take advantage of the information
that A’s behavior reveals.
The equilibrium in the case of harsh competition is characterized by the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When R > Rharsh, then the Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game played at
t = 2 once A has entered the …rst market:
(i) is separating if p ¸ pboth(R): In equilibrium, if s = 1 A enters the second market, while
B enters both markets at t = 2;
(ii) is semi-separating if p 2 £ppool; pboth¢ : In equilibrium, if s = 1 A enters the second
market with probability y¤ and does not with probability (1 ¡ y¤): Firm B enters the second
market with probability x¤ and does not enter any market with probability (1 ¡ x¤) ;
(iii) is pooling if p < ppool: In equilibrium, A does not enter the second market and B does
not enter any market:
When, at t = 2; it does not enter any market; …rm B updates its beliefs in this way: if
A has entered the second market, then B believes that s = 1 with probability 1; if A has not
entered the second market, then B believes that s = 1 with probability 0 if p ¸ pboth, with
probability (1¡y
¤)p
(1¡y¤)p+(1¡p) when p 2
£
ppool; pboth
¢
and with probability p when p < ppool: Where
y¤ = pbothp
³
p¡ppool
pboth¡ppool ,´ x
¤ = I+2±R¡1R(2±¡1) :
When rivalry is harsh, B’s entry is particularly harmful. Firm A is willing to forgo the pro…ts
available in the second market and, therefore, to play a pooling strategy according to which it
does not enter the second market independently of the observed s; if this choice preempts B’s
entry. This happens when priors are su¢ciently low: p < ppool: On the contrary, when priors
are high (p ¸ pboth), …rm B enters both markets as soon as it can, the decision of A has no
in‡uence on B’s actions, so that the best A can do is to locate in the second market if s = 1:
For intermediate values of priors, p 2 £ppool; pboth¢ ; the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Firm
A randomizes between entering or not entering the second market, while B randomizes between
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entering one market or not:10 The probabilities according to which A and B randomize satisfy
another condition. If the result of the randomization is that no …rm enters any market at t = 2,
then the beliefs of …rm B are so worsened that, the next period, it will choose not to enter any
market: That is, B is preempted.
Simple di¤erentiation leads to the following result.
Lemma 3 The probability according to which B chooses not to enter any market in the semi-
separating equilibrium of the signaling game, (1 ¡ x¤), is a decreasing function of the level of
rivalry, r:
In the semi-separating equilibrium, …rm A is indi¤erent between entering the second market
or not. The latter choice is valuable since with probability (1 ¡ x¤) it preempts B. Clearly,
the stronger the e¤ect of rivalry (the higher r), the greater the advantage of preempting the
competitor and then the greater the advantage of choosing not to enter the second market.
Therefore, to keep …rm A indi¤erent between entering and not in the second market a decrease
in (1 ¡ x¤) has to be associated with an increase in r.
2.4.2 The Results
Unfortunately, determining the equilibrium of the game turns out to be particularly cumber-
some. Several cases should be considered to completely characterize the optimal choices of
…rms A and B. These cases do not signi…cantly di¤er from each other. In what follows I just
present two of them (one for the non-harsh and one for of harsh rivalry cases) and I focus on
the strategic behavior of …rm A.11 I say that A behaves strategically when its entry pattern
di¤ers from the one it chooses in the benchmark for the same values of the priors.
In case of rivalry the strategic aim of …rm A is that of preempting or postponing entry of
its competitor. Preemption is possible only in the case priors are low enough: p < ppre: In this
case, entering the two markets at the same time, …rm A does not reveal any information and
10Note that the mixed strategy equilibrium “approaches” the pure strategy ones. That is, when p = ppool then
y¤ is equal to 0 so that A chooses not to enter the second market with probability 1: When p = pboth; then y¤ is
equal to 1 and so A chooses to enter the second market with probability 1:
11The results and proofs for the cases I omit in this version of the paper are available upon request.
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this choice induces …rm B to stay out from any market. When priors are larger that ppre; this
kind of strategic behavior is not possible. As I check, in this case, the typology of strategic
actions chosen by …rm A depends on the equilibrium of the signaling game.
Rivalry is not harsh: R · Rharsh
In this subsection, I characterize the equilibrium choices of …rm A and …rm B for the case in
which R 2 £Rc; min©Rharsh; Rdª¤.12
Proposition 2 When R 2 £Rc;min ©Rharsh;Rdª¤, then:
(i) A enters both markets at t = 1 and B enters both markets at t = 2 if p ¸ pboth;
(ii) A enters both markets at t = 1 and B enters markets sequentially if p 2 £pd; pboth¢ ;
(iii) A enters markets sequentially and B chooses to wait and see if p 2 £ppre; pd¢ ;
(iv) A enters both markets at t = 1and B does not enter any market if p 2 [pe; ppre) ;
(v) A enters markets sequentially and B chooses to wait and see if p 2 £pf ; pe¢ ;
(vi) A does not enter any market and B enters markets sequentially if p 2 £pprer=0; pf ¢ ;
(vii) no entry takes place if p < pprer=0:
As it was the case in the benchmark, …rms face a trade-o¤ between higher potential prof-
itability and additional information. When priors are high, …rms enter markets as soon as they
can. As the probability that s = 1 decreases, then …rms try to collect additional information
before entering.
Firm A’s Strategic Behavior
When priors are high, p ¸ pboth , there is no room for strategic behavior. Firm B enters
both markets at t = 2 and this independently of A’s choices. For intermediate values of p,
12To characterize the equilibrium of the game when R · Rharsh , I should consider four cases: R · Rc ;
R 2 £Rc;min ©Rharsh;Rdª¤ ; R 2 £Rd;min ©Rharsh; Rf ª¤ or R 2 £Rf ;Rharsh¤ : The relation among Rharsh; Rd
and Rf is not established a priori. E.g. when ± <
¡ 1
3
¢ 1
2 ; then Rc · Rd · Rf so that the third of the four cases
is not de…ned.
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p 2 £ppre; pboth¢, …rm A is able to in‡uence B’s behavior. Entering the two markets at the same
time, A reveals no information and induces B to enter markets in a sequential way, starting at
t = 2: On the contrary, when entering just one market, …rm A is implicitly “promising” B to
reveal the true state of s: Indeed, when R · Rharsh; the equilibrium of the signaling game is
always separating. In this case, the optimal response of B is to wait and see and then to decide
about entry in both markets only at time t = 3: Therefore, by choosing a sequential entry
pattern, …rm A is able to delay the competitor’s entry. This implies that there is a strategic
incentive to choose this entry pattern. In the appendix I check that for intermediate values of
the priors, …rm A prefers to enter markets sequentially rather than both at the same time for
any p < pd:
A comparison with the benchmark leads to the following result.
Corollary 1 When R 2 £Rc;min ©Rharsh;Rdª¤, then for any p 2 £pbothr=0; pd¢ …rm A enters
markets sequentially for strategic reasons. The interval where the strategic behavior takes place
enlarges as the level of rivalry, r; increases.
Corollary 1 points out the interval of priors for which this strategic behavior arises. That
is, …rm A enters both markets at the same time in the benchmark, while it chooses a sequential
pattern in case of rivalry. Clearly, the higher r, the more pro…table is to act strategically
and, consistently, the larger the set of priors for which this behavior arises. This result can be
easily checked observing that pd is increasing in r: A direct implication of the corollary above
is captured in the following remark:
Remark 1 For any p 2 £pbothr=0; pd¢ ; …rm A reveals the true s under rivalry, while it does not
reveal any information in the benchmark.
In other words, under the previous conditions, rivalry among …rms increases the cases where
there is revelation of information.
When priors are low, p < ppre, …rm A is able to preempt its competitor by entering the
two markets at t = 1: On the contrary, by condition (2.1), a sequential entry pattern is never
preemptive when the equilibrium of the signaling game is separating. This time, strategic
reasons induce …rm A to enter the two markets at t = 1. In the appendix I check that A prefers
14
this strategy whenever p ¸ pe: Firm A’s strategic behavior when priors are low is summarized
in the corollary below:
Corollary 2 When R 2 £Rc;min©Rharsh; Rdª¤, then for any p 2 [pe; ppre) …rm A enters both
markets at t = 1 for strategic reasons. The interval where the strategic behavior takes place
enlarges as the level of rivalry, r; increases.
When p 2 [pe; ppre) ; under rivalry, …rm A enters both markets at t = 1 while, in the bench-
mark, it enters them sequentially. As said this change is due to strategic motives. Moreover,
as r increases, the interval where the strategic behavior arises enlarges. This happens because
of two reasons. On the one hand, as competition becomes stronger it is more advantageous to
preempt B; that is, pe decreases in r: On the other hand, the stronger the e¤ects of competition,
the larger the set of priors for which B is preempted; that is, ppre increases in r.
Rivalry is harsh: R > Rharsh
Even when R > Rharsh , the complete characterization of the equilibrium requires distinguishing
among several cases.13 Here, I present just one of them. The results for the other cases are
similar.
Proposition 3 When R 2 ¡max©Rharsh; Rdª ; Re¢, then:
(i) A enters both markets at t = 1 and B enters both markets at t = 2 if p ¸ pboth;
(ii) A enters both markets at t = 1 and B enters markets sequentially if p 2 £ph; pboth¢ ;
(iii) A enters one market at t = 1 and, at t = 2; the semi-separating equilibrium of the
signaling game is played if p 2 £ppre; ph¢ ;
(iv) A enters both markets at t = 1 and B does not enter any market if p 2 [pg; ppre) ;
(v) A does not enter any market and B enters markets sequentially if p 2 [pprer=0; pg) ;
(vi) no entry takes place if p < pprer=0:
13Three cases should be considered: R 2 ¡Rharsh ;Rd¢ ; R 2 ¡max ©Rharsh; Rdª ; Re¢ and R >
max
©
Rharsh ;Re
ª
:
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When competition is harsh, …rm A chooses to enter one market at t = 1 only for limited
range of priors. In other words, when R > Rharsh, A tends either to locate into both markets
at the same time or to enter no market at all. Recalling the analysis done in lemma 2, we
know that after locating into the …rst market …rm A does not always enter the second even
once s = 1 has been observed. When p < pboth; the equilibrium of the signaling game is either
semi-separating or pooling. This means that, in an attempt of preempting the competitor, …rm
A does not take advantage of the information that it has collected. For this reason, locating in
one market at t = 1 tends to be non-optimal.
Firm A’s Strategic Behavior
Similarly to the previous case, …rm A is able to in‡uence B’s behavior and, therefore, it can
act strategically only when priors are intermediate or low. However, when p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ;
the reasons that induce …rm A to behave strategically are di¤erent from above. Entering just
one market at t = 1 and playing the semi-separating equilibrium of the signaling game14 is the
only chance to preempt the competitor. Indeed, as pointed out in lemma 2, if the result of the
randomization is such that no …rm enters any market at t = 2; then B’s beliefs are so worsened
that it does not enter any market at t = 3 neither. In the appendix I check that given B’s
responses, A prefers to enter one market rather than both for any p < ph:
A comparison with proposition 1 leads to the following result:
Corollary 3 When R 2 ¡max©Rharsh; Rdª ; Re¢, then for any p 2 £ppre; ph¢ …rm A enters
only one market at t = 1 for strategic reasons. The interval where the strategic behavior takes
place shrinks as the level of rivalry, r; increases.
Corollary 3 highlights the range of priors for which this strategic behavior arises. In partic-
ular, for any p 2 £ppre; ph¢ ; …rm A enters one market at t = 1 under rivalry and both markets
in the benchmark. However, this range shrinks as r increases. This last result is due to two
e¤ects. On the one hand, as pointed out in lemma 3, as r increases the probability that B enters
no market at t = 2, (1 ¡ x¤) ; and, then, the probability of preempting B decreases. That is,
14In the appendix I check that ppool · ppre and then for any p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ; the equilibrium of the signaling
game is the semi-separating.
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the stronger the degree of competition the less likely that entering one market at t = 1 leads
to the preemption of the competitor and, therefore, the less advantageous for A to play this
strategy. This result, is re‡ected in the fact that ph is decreasing in r. On the other hand,
an increase in the level of rivalry enlarges the set of priors for which entering both markets at
t = 1 preempts B. That is, an increase in r increases ppre: As I argue below, when entry in both
markets is preemptive, then entering one market at t = 1 is a dominated choice.
For the case of low priors (p < ppre) I obtain a result similar to corollary 2. Firm A, in
order to preempt the competitor, chooses to locate in both markets at t = 1 more often under
rivalry than in the benchmark.
Corollary 4 When R 2 ¡max©Rharsh ;Rdª ;Re¢, then for any p 2 £pg; pbothr=0¢ …rm A chooses
to enter both markets at t = 1 for strategic reasons. The interval where the strategic behavior
takes place does not depend on the level of rivalry, r:
Di¤erently from corollary 2, this time, the interval where the strategic behavior arises does
not depend on r: The reason for this result is that the choice of entering one market at t = 1
is dominated.15 Indeed, in the semi-separating equilibrium that follows it is optimal for …rm A
not to take advantage of the information that it has learned.16 That is, it is optimal not to
enter the second market even if s = 1: Therefore, when the expected revenues are larger then
the investment costs, p¡ I > 0; the optimal entry pattern is to enter both markets at t = 1; in
this way …rm A collects pro…ts from both markets rather than from just one. When p ¡ I < 0;
any entry mode assures a negative expected pay-o¤ so that …rm A is better-o¤ entering no
market at all. The pay-o¤s of entering the two markets at t = 1 or not to enter any market do
not depend on r, then neither the set where A behaves strategically does.
15In the case analyzed in corollary 3, when p 2 £ppre ; pboth¢, entering one market is not a dominated strategy.
Indeed, doing so and then playing the semi-separating equilibrium of the signaling game is the only way to
preempt B with positive probability.
16In the appendix I check that ppool · pg · pbothr=0 ; therefore for p 2
³
pg ; ppoolr=0
´
the semi-separating is the
equilibrium of the signaling game. In this equilibrium, …rm A once it has observed s = 1 is indi¤erent between
entering and not the second market. This means that, independently to the observed s; it is optimal to stay out
from the second market.
17
2.5 Complementarities
To complete the analysis of the …rst mover’s strategic behavior, it is worth considering the case
in which r < 0; that is, the case in which there are complementarities between the two …rms.
Various are the scenarios in which this condition is likely to be met. For instance, if the goods
that the two …rms sell are perceived as complements, then their simultaneous presence in the
market increases the willingness to pay of the consumers. Another case could be that of two
…rms that are vertically related with one of them being the supplier of the other.
I do not characterize the equilibrium of the game for this case. Indeed, this would require
particularly cumbersome calculations. The reason is that, contrarily to the previous frameworks,
under complementarities, choosing to enter both markets at t = 2 is not a dominated strategy for
…rm A. Given that entering both markets either at t = 1 or at t = 2 induces the same response
by …rm B, then, both in the benchmark and rivalry cases, the former choice is preferred to the
second or, if not, then they both assure a negative pay-o¤. One can check that this does not
occur in the case of complementarities. Indeed, when r < 0; …rm A gets low pro…ts in the early
periods when it is the only active …rm in the markets.
With complementarities., the aim of the …rst mover is to induce B to enter as soon as
possible. Choosing a sequential entry pattern,17 …rm A might encourage B to wait and see
and then to postpone entry. Entering the two markets at the same time, A induces B to
starting entering at t = 2: Therefore, strategic reasons might induce the …rst mover to enter
both markets at the same time thus not revealing any information to B. In the appendix, I
provide an example in which this happens. That is, in the example, …rm A chooses to enter
both markets at time t = 2 only because of strategic reasons; if its behavior were not to a¤ect
B’s choices, then A would prefer to enter markets sequentially: In the example, parameter R is
su¢ciently negative (i.e. the level of complementarities is su¢ciently high) that inducing …rm
B to enter earlier is particularly valuable.
The choice of entering both markets at the same time rather than sequentially is the only
case in which, when r < 0, the strategic behavior of …rm A might arise. Indeed, the other
two ways of strategically inducing …rm B to enter do not play any role in equilibrium. First,
17Once entered the …rst market, …rm A enters also the second i¤ s = 1:
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…rm A attracts B by being present in both markets, thus assuring it an extra ¡sr per period.
However, independently of the entry pattern, by time t = 2; that is, by the time in which B
moves, …rm A is located in both markets in the relevant case; that is, when s = 1: Second,
when priors are so low that B expects a negative pay-o¤, …rm A could induce it to enter by
choosing a sequential pattern and then revealing that s = 1: However, when r < 0, it is the …rst
mover’s non-negativity constraint which is binding. That is, if ignoring the true value of s, …rm
B expects a negative pay-o¤, then …rm A, when deciding about entry, anticipates a negative
pay-o¤ too. Therefore, neither …rm A enters.
2.6 Extensions: Endogenous First and Second Movers
In the analysis made so far, I have employed the standard assumption of the entry models “à
la Dixit”: there are an exogenous …rst and second movers. One might question whether this
structure arises as an equilibrium outcome. That is, if both …rms can move from the beginning
of the game, when will it happen that, in equilibrium, one …rm enters as …rst and, some time
later, the other follows?
Allowing both …rms to move at any t = 1; 2:::1; it is possible to address this question within
the model presented in the previous sections.
In this setting, the only rationale to postpone entry and to be the endogenous second
mover arises when the other …rm chooses an entry pattern that reveals the true state of the
markets. This means that a …rst-second mover structure arises only when one …rm enters
markets sequentially and the other chooses to wait and see.
Before starting the analysis, some remarks are in order. First, the identity of the …rst and
of the second mover is not determined That is, it is only possible to …nd conditions that assure
that one …rm enters as …rst and the other as second. As a convention, I consider …rm A as being
the …rst entrant. Second, the expected pay-o¤ of each …rm depends on its information about s
and on the markets already entered by the two …rms, but it is independent of the time index,
t. Thus, I concentrate the analysis on Markov perfect equilibria in which the strategies of each
…rm are not conditional on t. Third, when …rm A has entered the …rst market and …rm B the
second, two equilibria might follow. In the …rst, “non-collusive”, equilibrium, whenever s = 1
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each …rm enters the other market too. This equilibrium exists for any values of the parameters.
The second possible equilibrium is a “collusive” one. When s = 1; …rm A (B) does not enter the
second (…rst) market unless B (A) enters the …rst (second). One can check that this equilibrium
exists only for a limited range of the parameters.18 In the analysis that follows, I assume that
when each …rm has entered one market, then they always play the “non-collusive” equilibrium.
Finally, in what follows, I do not solve for the equilibrium of the whole game but I just check
when a structure with a …rst and a second movers arises.
2.6.1 The Benchmark: Independent Firms
In the benchmark, the next result holds:
Proposition 4 When A and B can play at any t = 1; 2:::1; then when r = 0; a …rst-second
mover structure arises in equilibrium for any p 2 £pprer=0; plr=0¢ :
When …rm B chooses to wait and see, A faces the same scenario as in proposition 1. There-
fore, analogously, it enters markets sequentially for any p 2 £ppre(R = 0); pboth(R = 0)¢ : The
set of priors for which B is willing to play wait and see, p < plr=0; is smaller than that of
proposition 1, i.e. plr=0 · pbothr=0 . Indeed, in this setting this strategy requires to wait for two
periods and not just for one before learning the true value of s:
2.6.2 Rival Firms
Rivalry is not harsh R · Rharsh
The analysis of section 4 is largely applicable to this case. In particular, the equilibrium of the
signaling game is unchanged.
When prior probabilities about markets pro…tability are at an intermediate level, p 2¡
ppre; pboth
¢
; then the following result holds:19
18In the model of section 2, the “collusive” equilibrium does not arise. Indeed, B always enters the …rst market
as soon as s = 1:
19For high values of priors the two …rms enter the both markets at t = 1:
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Proposition 5 When A and B can play at any t = 1;2:::1, then when R · Rharsh for
intermediate values of p; p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ; the set of priors for which a …rst-second mover
structure arises in equilibrium is larger in the case of rivalry than in the benchmark.
Proposition 5 provides an interesting prediction. When rivalry is not harsh and priors are at
an intermediate level, then it is more likely to observe the emergence of a market structure with
a …rst and a second movers when there is rivalry. The intuition for this result is the following.
The emergence of this structure requires two conditions: one …rm enters markets sequentially
and the other chooses wait and see. As proved in section 4, when priors are intermediate,
the …rst entrant is more willing to choose a sequential entry pattern under rivalry; in this
way, it postpones the competitor’s entry. Therefore, strategic reasons favor the appearance
of a structure with a …rst and a second movers. Moreover, the opportunity cost of being an
endogenous second mover is represented by the pro…ts that this …rm forgoes by postponing
entry. In the benchmark, a second mover forgoes monopoly pro…ts, while, under rivalry, only
duopoly pro…ts. Therefore, it is “less costly” to wait and see under rivalry.
For low values of the priors (p < ppre), the e¤ects due to the strategic behavior of the …rst
mover and to the lower opportunity cost of waiting, work in opposite direction. Indeed, from
section 4, we know that the …rst mover is less willing to enter markets sequentially because in
this way it gives up the opportunity of preempting the competitor. This fact is detrimental for
the emergence of a structure with a …rst and a second movers.
Proposition 6 When A and B can play at any t = 1;2:::1, then when R · Rharsh for
low values of p; p < ppre; the set of priors for which a …rst-second mover structure arises in
equilibrium is smaller in the case of rivalry than in the benchmark, provided that either R 2£
Rg ;Rharsh
¤
or R · min ©Rharsh;Riª : In all the other cases the two sets are not comparable.
According to proposition 6, when p is low, the set of priors for which a …rst-second mover
structure arises in equilibrium is larger in the benchmark than under rivalry provided that the
lower cost of waiting that characterizes the latter framework plays no role in the comparison.
Indeed, one can check in the appendix that conditions R ¸ Rg or R · Ri that appear in
proposition 6 have the e¤ect of neutralizing the lower cost of waiting. In all the cases that do
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not satisfy one of these two conditions the sets where a …rst-second mover structure arises are
not comparable.
Rivalry is harsh: R > Rharsh
When rivalry is harsh, a …rst-second mover structure never emerges as an equilibrium outcome.
The formal proof of this statement is not presented in this chapter.20 On the contrary, in what
follows, I o¤er an informal and intuitive argumentation. As said, a structure with a …rst and a
second entrants arises when …rm A enters one market, B chooses a wait and see strategy and,
in the signaling game, it receives information about s: The equilibrium of the signaling game
has the same features as the one characterized in lemma 2. In particular, for high values of the
priors, the equilibrium is separating and …rm B enters both markets without waiting for more
information: However, in this case, B is better-o¤ entering both markets the previous period
rather than waiting. Therefore, for high values of the priors both …rms enter markets enter
markets immediately. For low values of the priors, the equilibrium of the signaling game is
pooling and …rm B is preempted. Therefore, neither in this case a …rst-second mover structure
arises. For intermediate values of p; the signaling game has a semi-separating equilibrium
where it is optimal for …rm B to enter one market.21 However, if this is the case, then B is
better-o¤ entering that market the previous period rather than waiting. Therefore, neither for
intermediate values of the priors a …rst-second mover structure arises.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have focused on investment decisions as means of transmitting information.
Various are the sources of information from which a …rm can bene…t when deciding about entry
in the markets: industry reviews, accounting data, stock market evaluations ... . However,
observing that a competitor is increasing the size of its investment is certainly a de…nitive signal
of pro…tability. I have introduced these features in a simpli…ed version of an entry model “à la
Dixit”. In particular, I have considered a …rst and a second mover that have the opportunity to
20The formal proof of the result is available from the author upon request.
21In the semi-separating equilibrium, B randomizes between entering one market or not.
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enter into two markets of unknown but correlated pro…tability. The …rst mover can enter the
two markets at the same time and just knowing the prior probabilities about pro…tability, or it
can enter them sequentially; that is, enter one market, observe the correlated pro…tability and,
the next period, condition entry in the second upon this new information. The second mover
has an additional possibility. When the …rst mover enters market sequentially, it can choose
a wait and see strategy. It observes whether the …rst mover enters the second market, infers
information about the markets conditions and decides about entry with a superior knowledge
regarding pro…tability.
In this context, I have characterized the …rst mover strategic behavior in the cases of rivalry
and of complementarities. In the former case , I have shown that when priors are such that
…rms believe that markets are likely to be pro…table, then the …rst mover cannot preempt the
competitor and the best it can do is to enter markets sequentially. This induces the second
mover to play wait and see thus postponing entry. On the contrary, when priors are such that
markets are likely to be unpro…table, then the …rst mover strategically enters the two markets
at the same time, reveals no information attempting to preempt the competitor.
In case of complementarities, that is, in case revenues are larger when both …rms are active
in the same market, the aim of the …rst mover is to encourage the other …rm to enter as soon
as possible. In this case, the …rst mover might strategically choose to enter both markets at
the same time because otherwise it induces the second …rm to wait and see.
In the last section of this chapter, I have analyzed whether a structure with a …rst and a
second movers can arise as an equilibrium outcome. That is, if both …rms had the opportunity
to play from the very beginning of the game, when would it be that a …rst-second mover
structure arises? The answer is shown to crucially depend on the level of competition among
…rms and on the prior probabilities about pro…tability. However, interestingly enough, I have
shown that when priors are su¢ciently good and competition not too harsh, then, with respect
to a benchmark, the fact that …rms are rivals increases the likelihood that a …st-second mover
structure arises in equilibrium.
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2.8 Appendix
List of de…nitions for R :
R ´ 1 ¡ I ;
Rharsh ´ (1¡I)2± ;
Rc ´ 2±(1¡I)1+±+2±2 ;
Rd ´ 2±(1¡I)1+± ;
Re ´ ±(1¡3±)(1¡I)(1¡2±¡±2) ;
Rf ´ 2±(1¡I)1+±2 ;
Rg ´ ±(1¡I)1¡± ;
Ri ´ 2±2(1¡I)1+± :
List of de…nitions for p :
pboth ´ I(1¡R)(1¡±)+±I ;
ppre ´ I(1¡R)(1+±)¡±I ;
ppool = I1+±(1¡R)¡±I ;
pd ´ I(1¡±R)(1¡±)+±I ;
pe ´ I(1¡±)+2±2R+±I ;
pf ´ I(1+±)¡2±2R¡±I ;
pg ´ I;
ph ´ I(2±¡1)
±R(1¡±)¡(1¡±)2+±2I ;
pi = I(1¡2±)(1+±R)(1¡±)¡±I ;
pj = 2I21¡R(1+±) ;
pl = I
(1+2±(1¡R))(1¡±)+2±2I¡±I :
Proof of Proposition 1
It follows immediately considering the pay-o¤s de…ned in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1
In equilibrium, …rm B expects 2 (p(1 ¡R) ¡ I) when entering both markets and p (1 ¡R)¡
I +±p ((1 ¡ R) ¡ I) when entering one market at t = 2 and the other at t = 3 i¤ s = 1. Playing
wait and see, B learns the true s and, at t = 3; it enters the two markets i¤ s = 1. The expected
pay-o¤ of this last strategy is 2±p((1 ¡ R) ¡ I) :
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wait and see when A enters sequentially: When A does not locate into any market then B faces
the same scenario as in the benchmark and it enters sequentially for any p 2 [pprer=0; ppre) and it
does not locate into any marker when p < pprer=0: Firm A enters both markets at t = 1, pay-o¤
2 (p ¡ I), if p 2 [pe; ppre) ; it enters sequentially, pay-o¤ p¡(1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡ ±) + ±2 (1 ¡R)¢¡I+
±p ((1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡ R) ¡ I), if p 2 £pf ; pe¢ and it locates into no market, pay-o¤ 0, if p < pf :25
Recall that pprer=0 · pf · pe · ppre:Q:E:D
Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2
One can check that
- pbothr=0 · pd, since R ¸ 0:
- ppre · pbothr=0 ; since R · Rd:
Therefore, combining these relations with the ones used in the proof of proposition 5:
pprer=0 · pf · pe · ppre · pbothr=0 · pd · pboth:
Propositions 2 and 1 assure that:
- for any p 2 £pbothr=0 ; pd¢ …rm A: enters sequentially under rivalry, while it locates into the
two markets at t = 1 in the benchmark;
- for any p 2 [pe; ppre) …rm A: enters the two markets at t = 1 under rivalry, while it enters
sequentially in the benchmark.Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3
In proposition 3, R 2 ¡max©Rharsh;Rdª ;Re¢ and by (2.1) it has to be R · R: These
conditions are simultaneously veri…ed for any R 2 ¡Rharsh; Re¢ when ± 2 h¡ 13¢12 ; 18 + 18p17´
and for any R 2 ¡Rd; Re¢ when ± ¸ 18 + 18p17: For ± < ¡ 13¢12 the above conditions cannot be
simultaneously veri…ed.
The following inequalities hold:
- ph · pboth; since R ¸ Rharsh and ± > ¡13 ¢12 ;
- ppre · ph; since R · Re and ± > ¡13 ¢12 ;
- pg · ppre; since R ¸ Rharsh;
- ppool · pg; since R · R;
- pprer=0 · ppool ; since R ¸ 0:
25Note that p ¸ pf assures that A gets a positive pay-o¤ by entering one market at t = 1, while B plays wait
and see:
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Overall:
pprer=0 · ppool · pg · ppre · ph · pboth :
- If p ¸ pboth; the proof is the same as in proposition 2.
- If p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ; …rm B enters sequentially if A has entered both markets at t = 1: If
A has entered only one market at t = 1then the semi-separating equilibrium of the signaling
game is played: Firm A prefers to enter both markets, pay-o¤
p
¡
2 (1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡ ±) + ± ((1 ¡ ±) ¡ r) +2±2 (1 ¡ R)¢ ¡ 2I , rather then just one, pay-o¤
p((1 ¡ ±) + ± (x¤ ((1 ¡ ±) + ((1 ¡ ±) ¡ r) ¡ I + 2± (1 ¡ R)) + (1 ¡ x¤) (2 (1 ¡ ±) ¡ I + 2± (1 ¡ R))))¡
I , whenever p ¸ ph: Given that ppre · ph · pboth the equilibrium is easily checked.
- If p 2 £ppool; ppre¢ ; …rm B is preempted when A enters the two markets at the same time,
while, as above, the semi-separating equilibrium follows when A has entered just one market.
When doesn’t locate in any market …rm B enters sequentially. Firm A enters the two markets
at t = 1, pay-o¤ 2 (p¡ I), for p 2 [pg ; ppre) while it doesn’t locate into any market, pay-o¤ 0,
for p 2 £ppool; pg¢ :
- If p < ppool, …rm B is preempted when at t = 1 …rm A enter either one or two markets.
However, since p < pg …rm A doesn’t enter any market since negative pay-o¤s are expected:
In this case, …rm B is the only possible entrant and it chooses to enter sequentially if p 2£
pprer=0; ppool
¢
while it doesn’t enter any market for p < pprer=0:Q:E:D
Proof of Corollaries 3,4
One can check that:
- pg · pbothr=0; since R · R;
- pbothr=0 · ppre; since R ¸ Rd:
Therefore, combining these with the inequalities used in proposition 3:
pprer=0 · ppool · pg · pbothr=0 · ppre · ph · pboth:
Propositions 3 and 1 assure that:
- for any p 2 £ppre; ph¢ ; …rm A: enters one market at t = 1under rivalry, while it enters both
markets in the benchmark;
- for any p 2 £pg; pbothr=0 ¢ ; …rm A: enters both markets at t = 1 under rivalry and only one in
the benchmark.Q:E:D:
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Example for the case of Complementarities
Assuming that 1 ¸ ±I1¡± ; ± ¸
¡1
3
¢1
2 and that the level of complementarities is su¢ciently high
(that is, R is su¢ciently negative), then:
* when ± 2
h¡1
3
¢1
2 ; 18 +
1
8
p
17
´
; in equilibrium, for any p 2 £pi; pboth¢, …rm A enters both
markets at t = 2 only because of strategic reasons;
* when ± 2 £18 + 18p17;1¢ ; in equilibrium, for any p 2 £pj; pboth¢, …rm A enters both markets
at t = 2 only because of strategic reasons:
Proof
De…ne Rk ´ ±I¡(1¡±)±(1¡±) : Condition R · Rk assures that the denominator of pi is negative.
One can check that:
pboth · pg ; when R · ±(I¡1)1¡± ;
pi · pboth ; when R · min
n
2±(I¡1)
1¡± ;Rk
o
;
pj · pi; when R · Rk and ± ¸ 18 + 18
p
17;
pi · pj ; when R · min
n
2±(I¡1)
1+±¡4±2 ; R
k
o
and ±
³¡ 1
3
¢1
2 ; 18 +
1
8
p
17
´
;
pj · pboth (R) ; when R · 0 and ± ¸ 13;
ppre · pi; when R · 0 and ± ¸ ¡ 13¢12 ;
ppre · pj; when R · 0:
Therefore when R is su¢ciently negative and ± 2 £18 + 18p17; 1¢ :
ppre · pj · pi · pboth · pg; when R is su¢ciently negative and ± 2
h¡1
3
¢ 1
2 ; 18 +
1
8
p
17
´
:
ppre · pi · pj · pboth · pg
Given that p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ; then B enters sequentially when A enters the two markets at
the same time either at t = 1 or at t = 2: When A enters sequentially, B chooses wait and
see: Therefore, …rm A expects p
¡
2 (1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡ ±) + ± ((1 ¡ ±)¡ r) +2±2 (1 ¡R)¢¡2I when
locating into the two markets at t = 1; ± (p ((1 ¡ ±) + ((1 ¡ ±) ¡ r) + 2± (1 ¡R)) ¡ 2I) when
entering them at t = 2 and p
¡
(1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡ ±) + ±2 (1 ¡R)¢¡I+ ±p((1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡R) ¡ I)
when choosing the sequential entry pattern. The second strategy (entering both markets at
t = 2) is preferred to the …rst for any p < pg and to the third for any p ¸ pi:26 Moreover, for
any p ¸ pj A expects a non-negative pay-o¤ when entering both markets at t = 2::
26Note that this last condition requires R · Rj:
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This implies that in equilibrium, when ± 2 £18 + 18p17;1¢ ; then for every p 2 £pi; pboth¢ …rm
A enters the two markets at t = 2. The same choice is made when ± 2
h¡1
3
¢ 1
2 ; 18 +
1
8
p
17
´
for
any p 2 £pj ; pboth¢ :
Note that these decisions are only due to …rm A’s strategic behavior. Indeed, if A’s behavior
were not to a¤ect that of B, then …rm A would prefer to enter both markets at t = 2 rather than
sequentially i¤ p(±I ¡ (1 ¡ ±)) + I (1 ¡ 2±) ¸ 0; this last inequality does not hold if 1 ¸ ±I1¡±
and ± ¸ ¡13¢12 :Q:E:D
Proof of Proposition 4
When …rm B plays wait and see then A faces the same scenario as in proposition 1. There-
fore, it enters markets sequentially for any
p 2 £pprer=0; pbothr=0¢ : In turn, …rm B prefers wait and see, pay–o¤ 2±2p (1 ¡ I),27 rather than
enter markets sequentially, pay-o¤ p¡ I + ±p (1 ¡ I) ; for any p < plr=0: Condition (2.1) assures
that: pprer=0 · plr=0 · pbothr=0:Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 5
Under rivalry, when A enters markets sequentially, then B prefers wait and see, pay-o¤
2±2p(1 ¡R ¡ I), rather then sequential entry, pay-o¤ p ((1 ¡ ±) + ± (1 ¡ R))¡I+±p (1 ¡ R ¡ I),
for any p < pl: When B waits and sees, then for p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ; A face the same situation
as in proposition 2 and it prefers to enter markets sequentially for any p < pd: When R ¸ 0;
pl · pd · pboth and then a …rst-second mover structure arises in equilibrium for any p 2 IR =£
min
©
ppre; pl
ª
; pl
¢
:28 In the benchmark, focusing on p 2 £ppre; pboth¢ ; a …rst and a second
mover arise for any p 2 IB = £min ©ppre; plr=0ª ; plr=0¢ : Since plr=0 · pl for any R ¸ 0; then
IB µ IR:Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 6
Under rivalry, as in the previous proposition, when A enters markets sequentially, B chooses
wait and see for any p < pl: When B plays according to this strategy, then for p < ppre;
A face the same scenario as in proposition 5 and enters markets sequentially for any p 2£
pf ; pe
¢
: One can check that pf · ppre; by R ¸ 0; pf · pe by R · Rharsh and pf · pl
27Note that in this case a wait and see strategy requires not to enter any market for two periods: t = 1 and
t = 2:
28Note that when min fx; yg = y; then [min fx;yg ; y) represents the empty set.
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by R ¸ 0 and R · R: Therefore, when p < ppre; a …rst-second mover structure arises in
equilibrium for any p 2 IR £pf ; min©ppre; pe; plª¢ : In the benchmark, focusing on p < ppre and
since pprer=0 · ppre for any R ¸ 0: then a …rst-second mover structure arises in equilibrium for any
p 2 IB = £pprer=0; min©ppre; plr=0ª¢ : Since pprer=0 · pf for any R ¸ 0; then IR µ IB provided that
min
©
ppre; pe; pl
ª · min ©ppre; plr=0ª : If the last inequality does not hold then IR and IB are
not comparable. When R ¸ 0 then plr=0 · pl and then the inequality holds i¤ either pe · plr=0
or ppre · plr=0: Condition pe · plr=0 holds i¤ R ¸ Rg: Therefore, the existence of this case
requires R ¸ Rg ; R · R and R · Rharsh. These conditions are simultaneously veri…ed for any
R 2 £Rg; Rharsh¤ i¤ ± ¸ 12: Condition ppre · plr=0 holds i¤ R · Ri: Therefore, the existence of
this case requires R · Ri; R · R and R · Rharsh: These conditions are simultaneously veri…ed
for any R · Ri when ± · 0:76 and for any R · Rharsh for ± > 0:76:Q:E:D:
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Chapter 3
The Governance Form of Strategic
Alliances: an Introduction
The next chapters deal with the issue of the governance form of strategic alliances. That is,
the subject under analysis is the way in which …rms organize their cooperative arrangements.
Various de…nitions of strategic alliances have been put forward. For instance, Hagedoorn
(1996) de…nes them as “... inter-…rm agreements aimed at improving the long-term prospects of
the involved companies ...”. Similarly, Root (1988) in a study on international alliances de…nes
“...an international cooperative arrangement as any form of long-term cooperation between two
or more independent …rms ... that undertakes or supports a business activity for mutual eco-
nomic gain”. The idea behind these de…nitions is that strategic alliances are hybrid forms of
businesses that lie between arm’s length transactions and mergers and acquisitions. That is, in
principle, they are mid-long term relationships that go beyond spot market transactions, that
require the continuous collaboration of the participating …rms but that leave them indepen-
dent. This means that, contrarily to mergers or acquisition, the involved …rms continue being
separated and distinct entities.
Several are the reasons that might induce …rms to cooperate. According to Contractor and
Lorange (1988) these range from cost and risk sharing to the possibility of reaching an e¢cient
scale of production and from strategic motives to government mandated requirements. Starting
from the study of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) a number of theoretical papers have
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focused on cooperation in Research and Development activities pointing out that alliances are
bene…cial since they allow the internalization of externalities and to capture larger spillovers.1
Hagedoorn (1993) in an accurate analysis on the rationales for cooperation stresses that besides
these classical arguments two major reasons that induce …rms to collaborate are the need of
complementary capabilities and the possibility of capturing some of the skills, knowledge or
technologies of partners.
In spite of these advantages, cooperation among …rms is not easily managed. For instance,
Business Week (1986) reports that according to two independent studies by McKinsey & Co
and by Coopers & Lybrand, seven out of ten strategic alliances fall short of expectations or are
disbanded. Likewise, Kogut (1989), underlies that there is strong evidence that alliances are
highly unstable.2
These di¢culties in the management of alliances emphasize the role of the governance form.3
That is, the way in which alliances are structured plays a primary role in conditioning their
probability of success and of failure. The traditional approach when studying this issue is the
one o¤ered by the Transaction Costs Theory.4 According to this literature, the governance
form of alliances can be classi…ed into two broad categories, namely equity and non-equity. The
former group is composed of Joint Ventures and minority equity participations. In case of a
Joint Venture, partners create and jointly own a new and separated entity (called, indeed, the
Joint Venture) in whose structures the cooperative activities are undertaken. In case of minor-
ity participations, the agreement involves the acquisition of minority positions in the capital of
the partner.5 The label “non-equity arrangements” includes a bunch of di¤erent organizational
forms that range from simple networking to more structured forms of governance such as tech-
nology exchange agreements, joint research agreements, co-production, co-development, ... .
1For a recent survey both on theoretical and on empirical aspects of R&D cooperation see Veugelers (1998).
2Similar conclusions are found in other studies, for instance Bleeke and Ernst (1992) and Doz et al. (1989).
3See Hagedoorn and Narula (1996), Osborn and Baughn (1990) and Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís (1996).
Kesteloot and Veugelers (1994) and Eaton and Eswaran (1997) make a di¤erent point. They employ a repeated
game framework to analyze whether the threat of no future cooperation can induce partners not to behave
opportunistically
4Among others, see Gulati (1995), Hennart (1988) and Kogut (1988).
5According to Gulati (1995) treating Joint Ventures and minority equity participations as a single category
can be justi…ed in terms of “...a direct equity investment by one …rm into another essentially creates an equity
Joint Venture between one …rm’s existing shareholders and the new corporate investor”.
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The common features of these arrangements are that they do not involve the sharing of equity
(that is, the relationship is purely contractual) and usually do not entail the creation of a new
and separated entity. The di¤erence between equity and non-equity arrangements on which the
Transactions Costs Theory focuses is the type of control that partners have over the cooperative
activities and over the assets that are used. Equity arrangements are closer to the case of full
ownership, while non-equity ones are more akin to arm’s length transactions. Therefore, the
comparison between these to categories resembles the classical one between hierarchical and
market (that is, contractual) types of control. The governance form employed will be closer to
either the hierarchy or the market extreme, depending on the amount of transaction costs. The
greater these latter are the better hierarchical organizations perform. In particular, according
to Gulati (1995) “The possibility of opportunistic behavior by a partner generates the most
salient transaction costs in the alliance context”.
Other studies claim that the discriminating feature relies on whether a separated entity is
created or not. Therefore, the relevant distinction is between Joint Ventures in which a new
…rm is created and Contractual Agreements where this does not happen. Pastor and Sandonís
(2001) point out that this di¤erence has important implications in terms of incentives,6 while
Tao and Wu stress that it has consequences on the ownership structure.7
The main advantages attributed to Joint Ventures or, more generally, to equity types of
arrangements can be summarized in two major points. On the one hand, partners obtain a
better alignment of their interests. Sharing the costs and the revenues of the jointly owned
venture they also share the same objectives. On the other hand, working together in a struc-
ture that is devoted to the joint project has advantages in terms of better monitoring of the
partner’s behavior, larger synergies and easier transfer of knowledge between partners. The
disadvantages associated with these organizational forms are related the long negotiations that
are usually required for their establishment and to the di¢culties and costs of modifying the
terms of the arrangements or to exit the alliance. Indeed, it is widely accepted that equity
6In their model a Joint Venture is a structure with two principals (the partners) and one agent (the common
laboratory i.e. the Joint Venture), while a Contractual Agreement is a structure with two principal (the partners)
each having its own agent (its own laboratory).
7In a Joint Venture partners are co-owners of the innovation they obtain, while in a Contractual Agreements
each of them is an individual owner of the innovation; that is, it can freely use it without the consensus of the
other partner.
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agreements require a larger commitment both in …nancial as well as in organizational terms
and therefore any amendment of the initial agreement comes at di¢culties. The advantages and
disadvantages usually ascribed to non-equity agreements are the reverse of the medal. They
are more rapidly arranged, require less commitment and are more ‡exible both in terms of
modifying the objectives and scope of the alliance as well as in terms of exiting it. However,
these organizational forms are considered to be more vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior
of the partner and also the possibilities of learning from each other as well as the creation of
synergies are reduced.
In chapter 4, I present a theoretical model in which I consider the e¤ect of learning one
partner’s know-how on the performances of a Joint Venture and a Contractual Agreement.
Hagedoorn (1993) stresses that sometimes alliances are “...merely a cover-up for an attempt to
quickly absorb some innovative capabilities from others”. Similarly, Baughn et al. (1997) warn
against the costs of unintended informational leaks and state that “Uncontrolled information
disclosure may allow one’s partner increased bargaining power in the relationship, or possibly
help to create a future competitor”. I concentrate on the link between learning and the bar-
gaining power of the partners. In particular, I claim that this link has a di¤erent impact on a
Joint Venture and on a Contractual Agreement and, therefore, on their optimality. 8
As pointed out above, the need of complementary capabilities has been recognized as one
of the leading rationales for cooperation. In chapter 5, I focus on this kind of alliances. The
main objective is to relate the governance form to the typology of the project that partners are
pursuing and to the characteristics of the sector in which the alliance takes place. I assume
that, ex-ante, each …rm is uncertain about some of the characteristics of the partner and I show
that uncertainty has a detrimental e¤ect on the incentives to invest. Interpreting this result in
terms of the governance form, I expect that the larger the uncertainty the more arrangements
that require low levels of commitment tend to prevail.
In the last chapter of the thesis, I present an empirical assessment. This analysis is based
on Comino, Mariel, Sandonís (2001) and uses a database on alliances that has been created
at the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven. The objective is to test the principal predictions of
8The issue of the creation of a stronger competitor through the dissemination of kow-how has already been
addressed in a series of studies. Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís (1996) and Pastor and Sandonís (2001) present a
theoretical approach to this issue, while Contractor and Lorange (1988) o¤er a more anecdotal analysis.
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the theoretical literature as well as some of the main hypotheses that can be derived from the
models of chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 4
On the Governance Form of R&D
Alliances: Joint Ventures and
Contractual Agreements1
4.1 Introduction
In the literature about partnerships, a commonly remarked aspect is that an alliance is a way
of disseminating existing knowledge. While collaborating, …rms not only pursue a targeted
project but they also learn from each other. Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís (1996) and Pastor
and Sandonís (2001) show that when partners are rivals there are little incentives to share
know-how. An increase in the know-how that a …rm provides to the alliance has two e¤ects:
it increases the expected pay-o¤ of the project undertaken but it also enlarges the amount of
knowledge that the partner learns, making it a stronger competitor in the market in which
…rms are rivals. In particular, Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís (1996) prove that the joint e¤ect
of moral hazard, learning and rivalry may prevent the formation of pro…table alliances.
In this chapter, I focus on the e¤ects of learning the partner’s knowledge on the perfor-
1I would like to thank my advisor David Peréz-Castrillo, Inés Macho-Stadler, Joel Sandonís and
Reinhilde Veugelers for helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper. I am also grateful to
the partecipants at the workshops at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Katolieke Univer-
siteit of Leuven, Jornadas de Economia Industrial (Madrid) and Simposio de Analisis Economico
(Barcelona).
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mances of two typical modes of organizing an alliance: Joint Ventures (JVs) and Contractual
Agreements (CAs).2 While at the very beginning of a relationship each …rm lacks some basic
input3 and, therefore, it completely depends on its partner for the project’s completion, as
cooperation carries on, learning one’s other capabilities alters this dependence. When a …rm
has learned a su¢cient amount of the partner’s know-how it could complete the project on
its own and, therefore, the level of dependence from the partner is reduced. This means that
the process of learning alters the bargaining positions that …rms have within an alliance. The
link between learning and bargaining power has been pointed out in a number of studies. For
instance, Hamel (1991) stresses that power within an alliance crucially depends on the ability
to outlearn one’s partner and that “successful learning at each stage obsolesced existing bargain
...”. Similarly, Prahalad and Hamel (1990) state that “when collaborating with a competitor,
failure to outlearn one’s partner could render a …rm …rst dependent and then redundant within
the partnership”. I claim that the link between learning and bargaining power has a di¤erent
impact on a JV and a CA and, therefore, on their optimality.
In the model, I consider an R&D alliance between two …rms possessing complementary
technologies. Partners choose whether to organize it as a JV or as a CA. Once they have reached
an agreement, they provide their know-how to the relationship. Their contributions, i.e. the
know-how provided, have asymmetric e¤ects on the value of the project. At an intermediate
step of the alliance, partners obtain a prototype that determines whether project’s completion is
pro…table. Ex-ante, partners ignore what prototype they will obtain and are unable to contract
on it. Therefore, they can decide about project’s completion only after they have the prototype
in hand. However, by this time each …rm has learned part of the know-how provided by the
partner and this fact might a¤ect the …rms’ bargaining positions. The larger the know-how
that a …rm has learned the stronger its bargaining position. The ability to learn depends on
the absorptive capacity of a …rm. I assume the absorptive capacity to be exogenous. 4
2As I said in chapter 3, it is typical to classify the governance form of alliances into these two broad categories.
3In chapter 3, I have pointed out that the need of complementary capabilities is one of the principal rationales
for cooperation.
4This assumption has been implicitly employed in other studies dealing with the e¤ect of learning on the
alliance’s organization (Pérez-Castrillo and Sandonís (1996) and Pastor and Sandonís (2001)). On the contrary,
a series of papers originated by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) consider the absorptive capacity of a …rm as an
endogenous variable. The more in-house R&D a …rm is doing the more it can absorb from the R&D projects
that other …rms are independently carrying out. However, in my paper I am not considering …rms undertaking
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The feature that mainly distinguishes a JV from a CA is that in the former case a new
and separated …rm (the so-called Joint Venture) is established and devoted to undertake the
partners’ project.5 On the contrary, in a CA, joint activities take place in structures that
already exist6 and in which other projects are possibly run at the same time. I claim that this
di¤erence results, de facto, in a distinct distribution of property rights on the prototype. In a
JV, a …rm cannot threaten the partner to use the prototype on its own. Indeed, a structure
devoted to the project was employed and the partner can prove that the prototype is due to the
joint activities and, then, that it owns it too. That is, in a JV partners are, de facto, co-owners
of the prototype. This fact does not occur in a CA. In this case, the fruits of the joint activities
are not easily singled out. No structure devoted to the common project was employed and,
then, the results of cooperative e¤orts might be confused with those of other projects that were
simultaneously run within the same buildings. Therefore, de facto, each …rm is entitled to use
the prototype on its own (i.e. it is a private owner) and it can threaten the partner to do so.
This di¤erence implies that only in a CA an eventual change in the bargaining positions caused
by the dissemination of know-how plays a role. When partners get to know that the project
is pro…table, then its joint completion is automatic in case of a JV, while it is achieved after
bargaining in a CA. I assume that the bargaining process is done “à la Nash”. In the threat
point, each partner completes the project on its own.
This distinction between a JV and a CA is in line with the prediction made by other studies
tackling the same issue. Tao and Wu (1997) quote evidence that, indeed, the di¤erence between
these two organizational modes relies on the distinct ownership rights structure on the fruits of
the alliance. Similarly to what I claim, in a JV partners are co-owners while in a CA they are
individual owners.7 In the same vein, also the Transaction Costs Theory argues that the main
independent R&D projects. Conversely, I study the case of two …rms contributing (i.e. providing know-how) to
a joint R&D project.
5A typical example of a Joint Venture is the one o¤ered by the alliance between Rhone-Poulenc and Snia.
In february 1994 the two companies agreed to set up a 50-50 JV to carry out engineering plastics projects.
According to the agreement, the new company, called Nyltech, was based in Lyon and “All of the production
sites and technical centers will be included in the Joint Venture” (Financial Times, 23rd of february 1994).
6For instance, in september 1996 Mitsubishi and Hindustan Motors agreed on technical collaboration. Ac-
cording to the agreement “Production will start at an Hindustan Motors plant ...” (Financial Times, 26th of
september 1996).
7Likewise, Osborn and Baughn (1990) de…ne “...a Joint Venture as a new legal entity with full status as a
corporate entity ... Joint Ventures provide joint ownership and control over the use and fruits of assets”.
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advantage of a JV relies on the superior control over joint activities that it assures to partners.
A CA, being more akin to market transactions, is more ‡exible but it assures less protection
against opportunistic behavior. In this paper, I interpret the fact that only in a CA a …rm can
threaten the partner to complete the project on its own as evidence of opportunistic behavior.8
In the model, the only di¤erence between the two forms of governance is due to the bar-
gaining process that takes place in a CA. During this phase the …rm with the largest absorptive
capacity tends to be in a stronger bargaining position and to receive a transfer. This fact
increases the e¢ciency of the alliance whenever the …rm with the largest absorptive capacity
is also the one whose know-how is most relevant for the project. That is, a CA is superior
when the transfer stimulates a larger contribution from the …rm that has the most valuable
know-how. If the contrary happens, a JV is more e¢cient. This is the main result of the
model. Making some comparative static analysis, I check that the more asymmetric partners’
absorptive capacities are the worse a CA performs. Even in the case in which the most rele-
vant partner receives a transfer, this might be excessive. Indeed, the magnitude of the transfer
is closely linked with the partners’ absorptive capacities and not with the relevance of their
contributions. This observation implies that when partners have very asymmetric absorptive
capacities choosing a CA might be hazardous . Finally, when the bene…ts that partners get
from the project become very asymmetric, then a CA tends to perform better. Indeed, during
the bargaining process there is a redistribution that has the e¤ect of equalizing the partners’
pay-o¤s.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the assumptions and the structure of the
model are outlined. In section 3, the model is solved and the principal results are derived. The
last section is devoted to the …nal remarks.
4.2 The Model
Two …rms (…rm A and …rm B) form an alliance to undertake an R&D project. Ex-ante they
ignore whether the project is feasible. That is, they know that only in some of the many
possible future contingencies project’s completion will be pro…table, but they ignore which
8In terms of the literature on incomplete contracts, only in a CA partners face a hold-up problem.
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contingency will occur. For ease of exposition, I only consider two possible contingencies. I
say that some time after starting the project …rms obtain a prototype. Ex-ante, they expect
that the prototype will be of a good type with probability p, of a bad type with probability
(1 ¡ p) ; being pro…table only in the former case.
The project requires two pieces of complementary know-how. These are provided by the
partners before learning about the prototype. Firm i = A;B only possesses the technology to
provide know-how Ki at a cost
K2i
2 : This is the cost necessary to adapt the technology to the
project or to convey it to the partners’ technicians. The levels of know-how are unveri…able
and partners choose them non-cooperatively. Once the prototype has been obtained partners
decide about project’s completion. When the prototype is of a bad type, then it is not pro…table
to ultimate the project. On the contrary, completing the project after a good type has been
obtained pays o¤ sAK1¡¯A K
¯
B and sBK
1¡¯
A K
¯
B to …rms A and …rm B respectively.
9 I assume the
pay-o¤s to be private and the previous expressions represent their reduced forms. For instance,
if the R&D project aims at reducing partners’ production costs, then the pay-o¤s might be
interpreted as the increased pro…ts due to the cost abatement. Parameter si is a measure of the
bene…ts obtained by …rm i. Parameters (1 ¡ ¯) and ¯ weight the relevance of the know-how
provided by …rms A and B for the value of the project; ¯ 2 (0; 1) and the larger it is the more
(less) relevant B’s (A’s) know-how is. Clearly, the expected pay-o¤s are increasing functions of
the amount of know-how provided. However, there is another e¤ect. By working together each
partner learns part of the know-how delivered by the other …rm. The e¤ects and the way in
which learning takes place are speci…ed below.
Partners cannot contract on KA and KB; on the type of the prototype and on the private
pay-o¤s. However, they can choose the governance form for their alliance. That is, they can
choose either to set-up a Joint Venture (JV) or to sign a Contractual Agreement (CA). This
decision is taken at the very beginning of the relationship, before choosing KA and KB and
before learning about the prototype. As said in the introduction, the di¤erence between a JV
and a CA is the resulting distribution of property rights on the prototype. I claim that a JV
stands for the case in which partners are, de facto, co-owners, while a CA represents the case in
9I assume that the know-how that partners provide a¤ects the value of the project but not the probability of
obtaining a good prototype. This is a simplifying assumption. However, assuming that p and (1¡ p) depend on
KA and KB would not signi…cantly alter the results at the cost of complicating the analysis.
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which they own the prototype individually. Once a good type of prototype has been obtained,
then in a JV, the only option that partners have is that of completing the project within the
partnership. On the contrary, in a CA each partner is entitled to complete the project on
its own. In this latter case, …rms decide about completion via a Nash bargaining process. In
case they fail to reach an agreement, each of them completes the project on its own obtaining
sAK1¡¯A
³
±AK¯B
´
and sB
³
±BK1¡¯A
´
K¯B respectively. Since they have been working together,
each …rm has learned part of the know-how provided by the partner. Therefore, by the time
in which the prototype has been obtained each …rm is able to complete the project on its own.
Clearly, …rm i is perfectly able to handle its own know-how, Ki; but not the one provided by
the partner, K¡i: The parameter ±i 2 [0;1] represents the absorptive capacity of …rm i: That
is, it indicates how e¤ective is …rm i in handling the knowledge provided by the partner:
Figure 1: the time line
The timing of the game is summarized in the Figure 1. At the beginning partners choose
either a JV or a CA. Subsequently, they choose KA and KB in a non-cooperative way. Then,
they learn about the prototype and decide whether to complete the project or not. Finally,
pay-o¤s are realized.
4.3 Solving the Model
I look for the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game. In the analysis the parameter
that measures the bene…ts of …rm A is normalized to 1; that is, sA = 1: Moreover, I denote
sB ´ s with s ¸ 0:
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4.3.1 Project’s completion
In case of a bad prototype partners dismiss the project. In case of a good prototype, joint
completion (i.e. the two partners ultimating the project together) is the e¢cient choice. Indeed,
KA and KB can be perfectly handled only when both partners are simultaneously involved in
the project. In case of a JV, joint completion is the only option that partners have and,
therefore, it follows automatically. In a CA each …rm can threaten the partner to complete the
project individually. Thus they agree on joint completion through a bargaining process. This
process is done “à la Nash”, partners have the same bargaining power and the threat point is
determined by what partners would obtain by completing the project individually. The Nash
bargaining solution is de…ned by the transfer, T; that solves the following program:
maxT
³
K1¡¯A K
¯
B¡ T ¡K1¡¯A
³
±AK¯B
´´³
sK1¡¯A K
¯
B + T ¡ s
³
±BK1¡¯A
´
K¯B
´
:
When T ¸ 0 , then …rm A pays a transfer to B, while T < 0 implies that it is B the one
which pays. Next lemma characterizes T the solution:
Lemma 4 In the case of a CA, the transfer in the bargaining process is:
T¤ (KA;KB) = 12K
1¡¯
A K
¯
B (1 ¡ ±A¡ s (1 ¡ ±B)) :
T¤ (KA;KB) ¸ 0 i¤ s · 1¡±A1¡±B and it is increasing in ±B and decreasing in both s and ±A:
Proof. It follows immediately
The sign, that is the identity of the …rm that pays the transfer, depends on both the relative
absorptive capacities of the two partners and on the bene…ts that they obtain from the project.
The transfer is positive (i.e. A pays B) when B’s absorptive capacity is high relative to that
of A and/or when the bene…ts that …rm B obtains from the project are low (i.e. s is low). In
particular, T ¤ (KA;KB) ¸ 0 implies that at least one of the following conditions holds: ±B ¸ ±A
or s · 1:
The absorptive capacity of a …rm positively a¤ects its pay-o¤ in the threat point. Therefore,
an increase in ±i strengthens …rm i0s bargaining position and, in general, the partner whose
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absorptive capacity is the largest is the one that obtains the transfer. The same reasoning
explains why T¤ (KA; KB) is increasing in ±B and decreasing in ±A: That is, the higher ±B or
the lower ±A, the higher the transfer that …rm B receives (or the lower the transfer that it pays).
At the same time, failure of the bargaining process has an opportunity cost: the project is
not completed in the e¢cient way and …rms only obtain the pay-o¤s of the threat point. Clearly,
the larger the bene…t a …rm obtains from the project (i.e. the larger s in case of …rm B), the
more a …rm is penalized by this event. Thus, the …rm that bene…ts most from the project tends
to be the one that pays the transfer. By the same reason, the larger s, the lower the transfer
that B receives (or the higher the transfer it pays). That is, T ¤ (KA; KB) is decreasing in s:
Clearly, as long as s = 1¡±A1¡±B the transfer equals zero and a JV and a CA are equivalent.
4.3.2 The Choice of KA and KB
Before learning about the prototype partners choose the levels of know-how to provide. They
do it in a noncooperative way. In case of a CA, …rms A and B solve respectively:
maxKA p
³
K1¡¯A K
¯
B ¡ T¤ (KA;KB)
´
¡ (KA)22
maxKB p
³
sK1¡¯A K
¯
B+ T
¤ (KA; KB)
´
¡ (KB)22 :
With probability p the prototype will be of a good type, the private pay-o¤s will be obtained
and the transfer paid.
Manipulating the F.O.C., the equilibrium levels of KA and KB can be written as:
KCAA = p (¯R)
¯
2 ((1 ¡ ¯)Q)2¡¯2 (4.1)
KCAB = p (¯R)
1+¯
2 ((1 ¡¯)Q)1¡¯2
where Q = 12 (1 + ±A+ s (1 ¡ ±B)) and R = 12 (s (1 + ±B) +1 ¡ ±A) :
In case of a JV …rms face a similar problem. The only di¤erence is that no transfer arises.
Therefore, …rms solve respectively:
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maxKA p
³
K1¡¯A K
¯
B
´
¡ (KA)22
maxKB p
³
sK1¡¯A K
¯
B
´
¡ (KB )22 :
The equilibrium values for KA and KB are:
KJVA = p (¯s)
¯
2 (1 ¡¯)2¡¯2 (4.2)
KJVB = p (¯s)
1+¯
2 (1 ¡¯) 1¡¯2 :
Comparing the equilibrium values of KA and KB
To simplify the presentation of the results, from now on I will focus on the case in which the
parameters satisfy the following condition:
(A1) s < 1¡±A1¡±B :
From lemma 4, this implies that in the bargaining process of a CA …rm B receives the transfer
from …rm A. This restriction causes no loss of generality. Indeed, if (A1) is not satis…ed, then
one obtains the same qualitative results as those I will present.
The optimal level of know-how that …rm i adapts in case of a JV depends on the pay-o¤
it gets but also on K¡i which determines the marginal productivity of Ki: In particular, as s
increases …rm B adapts a larger level of know-how, which has a positive e¤ect on the marginal
productivity of KA: On top of these e¤ects, in case of a CA, the transfer that B obtains alters
the distribution of the pay-o¤s. This fact a¤ects …rms’ choices in two ways. Firstly, …rm B gets
a larger share of pay-o¤s. This fact, accounts for a larger KB and a smaller KA: Secondly, there
is an indirect e¤ect that works in an opposite direction and that can compensate the …rst one.
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The increase in KB enlarges the marginal productivity of KA and thus it induces …rm A to
adapt an higher level of technology. Conversely, the lower KA caused by the transfer decreases
the marginal productivity of KB; thus, …rm B tends to reduce the amount of know-how it
provides. The magnitude of this indirect e¤ect depends on ¯ and (1 ¡ ¯) : The larger ¯ the
higher the magnitude of the indirect e¤ect caused by an increase of KB and the smaller that
caused by a reduction of KA:
Next lemma formally compares the equilibrium values of KJVi and KCAi ; i =; B:
Lemma 5 Assuming that (A1) holds, then the equilibrium values of KA and KB chosen in a
JV and in a CA satisfy the following conditions:
i) when s · min
n
1¡±A
1¡±B ;
1+±A
1+±B
o
; then KCAA ¸ KJVA i¤ ¯ ¸ ¯¤A; moreover KCAB ¸ KJVB ;
ii) in the other cases, KJVA ¸ KCAA ; moreover KCAB ¸ KJVB i¤ ¯ ¸ ¯¤B;
where ¯¤A = 2 lnQ
³
ln QsR
´¡1
; ¯¤B = ln sQR
³
ln RQs
´¡1
and lims!0 ¯¤A = 0.
When s is low (case i)), in a JV …rm B obtains a negligible pay-o¤ and, therefore, it provides
a low level of know-how. This fact has a detrimental e¤ect on the marginal productivity of KA.
The transfer to …rm B realized in a CA leads always to a larger level of KB; while it induces
an increase in KA whenever the indirect e¤ect caused by a larger KB is su¢ciently high (i.e.
provided that ¯ ¸ ¯¤A). Note that when s is very small, then KA and KB are always larger in
a CA; that is, lims!0 ¯¤A = 0 .
When s is not low (case ii)), KJVB is not negligible. In this case …rm A adapts always a
larger know-how in a JV, while …rm B chooses a larger KB in a CA whenever that the indirect
e¤ect caused by the reduced KA is low enough; that is, provided that ¯ ¸ ¯¤B:
4.3.3 The Optimal Governance Form
At the very beginning of their relationship, partners choose whether to structure the alliance as
a CA or as a JV. I assume that they select the governance form that maximizes the sum of their
expected pay-o¤s. That is, I assume that partners agree on choosing the most e¢cient mode.
Note that to guarantee that both A and B agree on this choice a transfer might be required
before starting. Next proposition characterizes the optimal choice:
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Proposition 7 Assuming that (A1) holds, then
² there exists a unique ¯ (s;±A; ±B) 2 (0;1) such that:
- if ¯ ¸ ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) ; then partners choose a CA;
- if ¯ < ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) ; then partners choose a JV.
The message of proposition 7 is quite intuitive. In a CA, …rm B receives a transfer and
this fact increases the e¢ciency of the alliance provided that KB is su¢ciently relevant for
the project. That is, provided that ¯ ¸ ¯ (s;±A; ±B) : Indeed, as checked in lemma 5 for large
values of ¯; then both …rms tend to adapt higher levels of technology in the case of a CA. In
particular, …rm B always adapts a larger KB: On the contrary, when ¯ is low, then a JV is
superior. Indeed, in a CA …rm B obtains the transfer even if its know-how is not the most
relevant.
4.3.4 Comparative static analysis
In a context in which it is not possible to contract on the know-how to be provided, the optimal
levels of KA and KB have to be stimulated through the pay-o¤s that partners get. Moreover,
the relevance of KA and KB for the project is not homogeneous as it is parameterized by (1 ¡¯)
and ¯: Therefore, in order to maximize e¢ciency, the total pay-o¤ of the alliance should be
shared between the partners in a way which is consistent with these parameters: However, this
is not possible in the framework under analysis. In a JV the distribution of the pay-o¤ is …xed:
…rm A obtains a share 11+s of the total pay-o¤, while B obtains
s
1+s: In a CA this distribution is
altered because of the transfer. However, the sign (i.e. the identity of the …rm which pays) and
the amount of the transfer are in‡uenced by s;±A; ±B and, therefore, they are not necessarily
consistent with ¯ and (1 ¡ ¯) :
For reasons of tractability, I use numerical examples to point out the e¤ects of changes in
s;±A; ±B on the cut-o¤ point ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) and, therefore, on the likelihood that a CA or a JV
is chosen.
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The e¤ect of ±B
In Table 1, I …x s = 1, ±A = 0:5 and consider values of ±B larger than ±A: 10 As shown,
¯ (s;±A; ±B) is always larger than 0:5. This means that a JV can be superior because of two
reasons. When ¯ < 0:5; KA is the most relevant know-how and, therefore, the transfer that A
pays in case of a CA has always a detrimental e¤ect on e¢ciency. When ¯ ¸ 0:5; the transfer
has a correct sign (KB is the most relevant know-how) but it might be “too large”. Indeed,
the magnitude of T is in‡uenced by s;±A; ±B and it might be excessive when ¯ is just slightly
larger than 0:5. As an extreme example, consider ¯ = 0:5: In this case, partners are perfectly
alike and e¢ciency would require that they equally split the total pay-o¤; this occurs in a JV
while in a CA …rm B receives a positive transfer.11 Closely linked with this, is the other result I
want to stress. The cut-o¤ point ¯ (s;±A; ±B) increases with ±B: That is, the more ±B increases
beyond ±A the smaller the set of ¯s for which a CA is superior. From lemma 4, the transfer
increases in ±B: Therefore, the greater the di¤erence between ±B and ±A the more likely that
the transfer is “too large” in the sense stressed above.
Table 1: the e¤ect of ±B
±B = 0:6 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:518
±B = 0:7 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 537
±B = 0:8 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 556
±B = 0:9 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:575
The e¤ect of ±A
Changes in ±A have a similar e¤ect as those of ±B and the intuition is alike. In Table 2, I …x
s = 1, ±B = 0:5 consider values of ±A lower than ±B: Similarly to the previous case ¯ (s;±A; ±B)
is slightly greater than 0:5: However, ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) is a decreasing function of ±A: That is, as ±A
10Recall that I am considering the case where s < 1¡±A1¡±B and when s = 1 this implies ±B > ±A:11For instance, B receives a T = 0:024 when ±B = 0:6:
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becomes closer to ±B; then a CA is preferred for a larger set of ¯s. Indeed, from lemma 4, the
transfer is decreasing in ±A
Table 2: the e¤ect of ±A
±A = 0:1 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:575
±A = 0:2 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:556
±A = 0:3 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:537
±A = 0:4 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:518
The e¤ect of s
Lastly, I consider the e¤ect of changes in s: Discussing lemma 5, I have pointed out that
when s is very small then in a CA the equilibrium levels of KA and KB are larger and, therefore,
this organizational mode is superior. Indeed, in this case, the only way to induce …rm B to
provide its know-how is that of redistributing the overall pay-o¤ through a transfer to this
…rm. This result is con…rmed when considering some numerical examples. In Table 3, I …x
±A = ±B = 0:5 and consider values of s lower than 1:
Table 3: the e¤ect of s
s = 0:1 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0:081
s = 0:2 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:146
s = 0:3 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 207
s = 0:4 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 264
s = 0:5 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 314
s = 0:6 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 360
s = 0:7 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 401
s = 0:8 ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) = 0: 437
s = 0:9 ¯ (s;±A; ±B) = 0:470
When s is very low, then a CA is nearly always preferred. That is, a JV is superior only in
the cases in which KA is basically the only relevant know-how for the project. For instance when
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s = 0:1 a JV is preferred only when ¯ < 0:081: As s increases then the need of redistributing
the pay-o¤s in favor of …rm B becomes less important. Therefore, as s enlarges, the set of ¯s
for which a CA is preferred shrinks. That is, ¯ (s; ±A; ±B) increases with s:
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have compared the performances of two typical modes of organizing alliances in
a context in which the di¤erent absorptive capabilities of the partners may alter their bargaining
positions. The formal di¤erence on which I have focused is the resulting ownership rights
structure on a prototype. I claim that a Joint Venture (JV) stands for the case in which partners
are, de facto, co-owners of the prototype, while a Contractual Agreement (CA) represents the
case in which each partner owns it individually. This di¤erence implies that, when partners
decide about project’s completion, then only in the CA case a bargaining process takes place.
During this phase the …rm with the largest absorptive capacity bene…ts from a transfer. I
have proved that a CA tends to be superior when the partner whose contribution is most
valuable for the project is the one that obtains the transfer. On the contrary, a JV performs
better. Moreover, since the transfer is closely linked with the partners’ absorptive capacities
and not with the relevance of their contributions, I have checked that choosing a CA might be
particularly hazardous when partners have asymmetric abilities to absorb know-how.
Before concluding, let me stress a couple of remarks. Firstly, the model is better suited for
the case of non-rival partners. Indeed, in the model, it is always dominant for …rms to complete
the project jointly. Were the …rms rivals, each of them would bene…t from the partner not
completing the project.12 Secondly, the model is very stylized. The only di¤erence between
a JV and a CA on which I have focused is the resulting distribution of property rights on a
prototype. In this way, I have neglected some of the alleged di¤erences between these two forms
of governance as pointed out in chapter 3.
12See Kesteloot and Veugelers (1994) on this point.
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4.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5
Call diffA ´ ¡KCAA ¡KJVA ¢ where KCAA and KJVA are de…ned by (4.1) and (4.2) respec-
tively. Condition diffA ¸ 0 holds i¤ (2 ¡ ¯) ln Q+ ¯ ln Rs ¸ 0:
Condition (A1) assures that @diff
A
@¯ > 0 and diff
Ac¯=0 < 0: Moreover, diffAc¯=1 > 0 i¤¡
1 ¡ ±2B
¢
s2 + 2 (±A±B ¡ 1) s + 1 ¡ ±2A > 0: This last expression is convex in s with roots 1¡±A1¡±B
and 1+±A1+±B :
Similarly, call diffB ´ ¡KCAB ¡ KJVB ¢ where KCAB and KJVB are de…ned by (4.1) and (4.2)
respectively. Condition diffB ¸ 0 holds i¤ (1 ¡ ¯) ln Q+ (1 ¡ ¯) ln Rs ¸ 0:
Condition (A1) assures that @diff
B
@¯ > 0 and diff
Bc¯=1 > 0: Moreover, diffBc¯=0 > 0 i¤¡
1 ¡ ±2B
¢
s2 + 2 (±A±B ¡ 1) s + 1 ¡ ±2A > 0: This last expression is convex in s with roots 1¡±A1¡±B
and 1+±A1+±B :Q:E:D.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let ¦mi denote the equilibrium pay-o¤ of …rm i = A; B when the organizational mode
of the partnership is m = CA; JV: a CA is chosen i¤
¡
¦CAA + ¦
CA
B
¢ ¡ ¡¦JVA + ¦JVB ¢ ¸ 0:
Manipulating the equilibrium pay-o¤s, one can check that this condition implies that a CA is
selected i¤ ¯ ln Rs +(1 ¡ ¯) lnQ+ln Q(1+¯)+R(2¡¯)(1+¯)+s(2¡¯) ¸ 0: I denote Diff this last expression; that
is Diff ´ ¯ ln Rs +(1 ¡ ¯) lnQ +ln Q(1+¯)+R(2¡¯)(1+¯)+s(2¡¯) : Next I will prove that there exists a unique
¯ (s;±A; ±B) 2 (0; 1) such that Diff = 0 and that Diff > 0 i¤ ¯ > ¯ (s;±A; ±B) :
Condition (A1) assures that: lim¯!0 Diff < 0 and lim¯!1 Diff > 0. Therefore, to end
the proof I need to check that @Diff@¯ > 0 for any ¯ 2 (0;1) and for all the relevant values of
the parameters: ±A 2 [0; 1] ; ±B 2 [0;1] ; s ¸ 0; s < 1¡±A1¡±B . Two helpful results are the following:
@
³
@Diff
@¯
´
@±A < 0 and
@
³
@Diff
@¯
´
@±B ¸ 0 with equality holding i¤ s = 0:13
Manipulating the expressions, then conditions s ¸ 0; s < 1¡±A1¡±B imply that ±A < 0; while,
s < 1¡±A1¡±B can be re-written as ±B > 1 ¡ 1¡±As : Therefore, I need to check that @Diff@¯ > 0 for
13The derivation of these results is long and tedious, therefore I skip it. However, a complete proof is available
upon request.
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any ¯ 2 (0;1) and for ±A 2 [0; 1] ; ±B 2 [0;1] ; s ¸ 0; s < 1¡±A1¡±B . Moreover note that 1 ¡ 1¡±As < 1
for any ±A 2 [0;1) while 1 ¡ 1¡±As ¸ 0 i¤ ±A ¸ 1 ¡ s: Consider two cases:
² ±A ¸ 1 ¡ s; note that since ±A 2 [0; 1) ; then it has to be s > 0: Therefore, I need to
check that @Diff@¯ > 0; for ±A [1 ¡ s;1) ; ±B 2
³
1 ¡ 1¡±As ; 1
i
and s > 0: One can check that
@Diff
@¯ c±B=³1¡ 1¡±As ´ = 0 and therefore using the fact that
@
³
@Diff
@¯
´
@±B
> 0 for any s > 0;
then @Diff@¯ > 0 in this case;
² ±A < 1 ¡ s; note that since ±A 2 [0; 1) ; then it has to be s < 1: Therefore, I need to
check that @Diff@¯ > 0; for ±A 2 [0;1 ¡ s) ; ±B 2 [0;1] and s 2 [0; 1) : One can check that
@Diff
@¯ c±A=(1¡s);±B=0 = 0; and therefore using
@
³
@Diff
@¯
´
@±A
< 0 and
@
³
@Diff
@¯
´
@±B
¸ 0 for s ¸ 0;
then @Diff@¯ > 0 in this case. Q:E:D:
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Chapter 5
Flexibility and Commitment When
Searching a Partner1
5.1 Introduction
As reported in chapter 3, one of the principal motives that induces …rms to cooperate is the need
of complementary capabilities. Hagedoorn (1993) points out that faced with “...the increased
complexity and intersectoral nature of new technologies and the cross-fertilization of scienti…c
disciplines ... even very large and diversi…ed …rms may lack some competence”. In this chapter,
I focus on this type of alliances and I relate the governance form that partners choose to the
typology of the project that they are pursuing and to the characteristics of the sector in which
the alliance takes place.
As already pointed out, the typical approach employed by the economic theory when dealing
with the governance form of alliances is that of distinguishing two broad categories: Joint Ven-
tures and Contractual Agreements. According to Chiesa and Manzini (1998) and Contractor
and Lorange (1988) the comparison between these two forms is nothing but a comparison be-
tween commitment and ‡exibility.2 In case of a Joint Venture, partners create a new structure
1I would like to thank my advisor David Perèz-Castrillo, Petr Mariel, Michele Moretto, Antonio
Nicolò, Joel Sandonìs and the participants to the workshops at Universidad del Pais Vasco, Bilbao
and Università di Padova for helpful comments. I acknowledge Reinhilde Veugelers and the project
FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database.
2Similar considerations are found in other studies such as Hagedoorn and Narula (1996), Hagedoorn (1996)
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where they jointly work at the common project. This solution requires a substantial commit-
ment both in organizational as well as in …nancial terms. Conversely, Contractual Agreements
have a more limited impact on the partners’ organizations, they usually require a smaller invest-
ment and are more easily amended both in terms of modifying the initial objectives and scope
of the alliance as well as in terms of exiting it. However, it is claimed that these arrangements
are characterized by a lower capacity of creating synergies between partners and by a more
limited possibility of monitoring each other’s behavior.
In section 2, I consider a pool of …rms willing to form alliances. Ex-ante, all …rms look alike
and each of them ignores some of the characteristics of the others. In particular, it ignores
whether the potential partners possess the technological and organizational characteristics re-
quired to undertake a common project. I say that each …rm is uncertain about the …t level
it has with any of the other companies. I interpret the …t level just as the technological or
organizational quality of the match between a couple of …rms; that is, I assume that it is not
related to the ability or e¢ciency of the companies. Partners decide about two things. At the
very beginning of the relationship, they choose the governance form for their alliance. I say
that partners decide how many assets to invest. One can interpret this choice as an invest-
ment in organization. In this way, in light of what claimed by Chiesa and Manzini (1998) and
Contractor and Lorange (1988), large investment can be thought as Joint Ventures and small
ones as Contractual Agreements. The invested assets are assumed to be alliance-speci…c and,
therefore, irreversible. Uncertainty about the …t level resolves while cooperating. That is, I
assume that after cooperating for some time, a couple of …rms learns the quality of the match.
Conditional on this information, partners decide whether to continue together or to separate
and search better matches. Clearly, the latter choice prevails when the observed …t level is
particularly low. However, when separating, partners lose the invested assets.
The model combines the tools of two strands of economic literature: irreversible investment
under uncertainty and search theory. The objective of the …rst literature is that of studying
the optimal investment behavior in changing and uncertain environments.3 The peculiar aspect
of an alliance that these studies do not capture is that it is a match between two (or more)
and Osborn and Baughn (1990).
3See Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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…rms. Therefore, even if, in general, many are the possible sources of uncertainty what is
typical of an alliance is that there is an extra one due to the unknown quality of the match
among the participating …rms. Search theory has been applied to many …elds of research and,
in particular, to labor economics. The paper that is closest to mine is the one of Jovanovic
(1979). This author considers a worker-…rm relationship in a context where both agents ignore
the worker’s productivity within the …rm. As time goes by, they observe a distorted signal of the
productivity and it is proved that the probability of separating decreases with tenure. The main
di¤erence with Jovanovic’s paper is that I also consider an investment decision. That is, in my
model, agents do not only decide if and when to separate but they also choose how many assets
to devote to their relationship. The interpretation I give to the …t level of a couple of …rms is
analogous to the one given to the worker’s productivity by Jovanovic. As said, this is not related
to the ability of the …rms but it is just a measure of the technological or organizational quality
of the match. This assumption greatly simpli…es the analysis since it allows not considering
any kind of reputation or adverse selection e¤ects. Indeed, the only information that can be
inferred when two …rms separate is that their technological or organizational …t is not high
enough.
The main result of the model is that the larger the uncertainty over the …t level the lower
the incentives to invest in irreversible assets. Therefore, I expect that in contexts in which un-
certainty is substantial, …rms relatively prefer Contractual Agreements to Joint Ventures. The
intuition for this result is rather simple. The larger the uncertainty, the higher the probability
of matching a partner with a low …t level. This means that, in more uncertain contexts, the
probability of separation and, thus, the probability of losing the investment is larger. This fact
has clearly a detrimental e¤ect on the incentives to invest.
In section 3, I test this prediction using a database on alliances that has been created at
the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven. In particular, I consider that uncertainty relates to two
variables: the typology of the project pursued by the alliance and the characteristics of the
sector in which this takes place. The empirical tests give a …rst and rough con…rmation to
the results of the model. Indeed, the proportion of Contractual Agreements that is chosen is
signi…cantly larger in cases where uncertainty is supposed to be higher; that is, when the alliance
is formed to pursue an R&D rather than a production or distribution and marketing project
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and when it takes place in an high tech rather than in a more mature sector. With respect to
this second point, I need to stress that a similar result has already been presented in a series of
empirical studies. For instance, according to Hagedoorn and Narula (1996) “Joint Ventures are
disproportionately represented in relatively mature industries. Contractual alliances dominate
strategic technology partnering in so-called high-tech industries”.4
The model I present shares some features with the one proposed by Rauch and Watson
(1999). These authors …nd that the higher the riskiness associated with a partner the more the
…rm prefers to start small; that is, run a pilot project that reveals additional information so
that the investment in the large project can be conditioned upon this news. However, it is not
possible to directly infer from this result that for riskier types of projects or in riskier sectors
…rms prefer to start small. Indeed, the analysis of Rauch and Watson is done by comparing the
optimal decision when facing two partners characterized by di¤erent levels of riskiness under
the assumption that, in case of separation, the …rm will look for a new allied by searching in a
common pool of potential partners. That is, the value of searching is common in the two cases.
My claim is that the value of searching depends on the context (i.e. the typology of the project
or the sector) in which this process takes place.5 If the value of searching depends positively
on the riskiness of the sector, the result of Rauch and Watson could even be reversed. Indeed,
the alternatives to starting small (run directly the large project or search a new partner right
away) bene…t more of an increase of the value of search.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the model and the main results are
presented. In section 3, an empirical evaluation of the principal prediction of the model is
o¤ered. The last section is devoted to the concluding remarks.
5.2 The Model
I consider a continuum of …rms willing to form alliances. Ex-ante, all …rms look alike and
each of them ignores some of the characteristics of the others. In particular, when forming an
alliance each …rm is uncertain about the …t level it has with the partner. The only available
4On this point, see also Hagedoorn (1996), Narula and Hagedoorn (1997) and Osborn and Baughn (1990).
5Note, however, that the relation between the investment level and the typology of the project or the sector
in which partners operate is not in the agenda of Rauch and Watson.
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information is that this is a random variable µ » U (1 ¡ "; 1) ; with " 2 (0;1) being a known
constant. Clearly, the higher " the larger the uncertainty about the …t level.6
Firms play an in…nite periods game in discrete time. At each period, the sequence of moves
is as follows. At the beginning, …rms form alliances by randomly matching in couples. Just
after matching, and still ignoring the realization of µ; each couple (alliance) chooses how many
assets, a; to invest; that is, it chooses the governance form. The investment is assumed to be
alliance speci…c and, therefore, irreversible.7 The cost of the investment is c2a
2: At the end
of the period, …rms observe µ and, conditional upon this information, they decide whether to
continue together or to separate. In this latter case, a is lost and …rms pay a search cost, s; to be
re-matched to other partners and form new alliances. Changing partner involves drawing a new
µ » U (1 ¡ "; 1) : This implies that the …t level just relates to the technological or organizational
…t of a couple of …rms. Therefore, learning the µ that characterizes the match with the current
partner is uninformative with respect to the …t level with any other …rm. Formally, this means
that the …t level of a couple of …rms, say i and j; is assumed to be independent of that
characterizing any other couple, say i and z:
The pay-o¤ that partners obtain depends on their …t level an on the amount of assets
invested. In particular, at each period, partners earn an overall pay-o¤ ¯µ+a, where parameter ¯
is a measure of the impact of the …t level. Using a separable pay-o¤ function allows concentrating
on the e¤ects of uncertainty (as measured by ") and irreversibility of the assets on the incentives
to invest. In this way, I rule out any “technological” aspect that might a¤ect the choice of a:
That is, with a separable pay-o¤ function, the marginal productivity of a does not depend on
":8
Throughout the paper, I assume that the partners of an alliance equally split earnings and
costs, that the investment a is perfectly contractible and no asymmetry of information about µ
6An increase in " also implies a lower expected …t level. Indeed, E [µ] = 2¡"2 : I will comment more about this
point in subsection 2.2.
7Complete irreversibility of the investment is an extreme assumption but it greatly simpli…es the analysis.
Moreover, any degree of alliance speci…city of the investment (i.e. any degree of irreversibility) would let the
argument of the paper go through.
8Moreover, this functional form can be thought as a reduced form of the supposed advantages of investing in
organization. The larger the commitment (i.e. the larger a), the larger the pay-o¤ given the synergies and the
enhanced monitoring capabilities. As said in chapter 3, these are the supposed advantages that Joint Ventures
have with respect to Contranctual Agreements.
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exists. Under these assumptions the objectives of the …rms involved in an alliance are perfectly
aligned and, therefore, considering the optimal decision at the …rm or at the alliance level is
analogous. I will focus on the alliance level.
5.2.1 Solving the Model
To characterize the equilibrium of the game, one needs to determine the optimal behavior of
an alliance both when choosing the investment level and when deciding about continuation or
separation. Let V denote the value of an alliance when partners are about to choose a and
still ignore the realization of µ. I will also refer to V as the value of searching, that is how
worthy (gross of the search costs) it is to look for new partners. Moreover, let V (a; µ) denote
the value of an alliance when …rms choose about continuation or separation. That is, V (a;µ)
says how worthy an alliance is once a has been sunk, µ has been observed and partners can
decide whether to continue together or to separate.
Continuing together, …rms earn ¯µ + a per period, discounting future pay-o¤s at a rate
± 2 (0; 1) : Therefore, the pay-o¤ of this strategy is ¯µ+a1¡± : If they separate, then each of them
pays half of the search costs, and, with one period of delay, it is matched with a new …rm with
…t level µ » U (1 ¡ ";1) : This means that, by separating, each …rm pays s2 and obtains ±V2 :
Therefore, the value of an alliance when choosing about continuation or separation is:
V (a;µ) = max
½
¯µ +a
1 ¡ ± ;¡s + ±V
¾
(5.1)
The pay-o¤ when continuing together is an increasing function of the observed …t level, while
the pay-o¤ from separating is not a¤ected by the current value of µ: Therefore, the decision
about continuation or separation is characterized by a trigger value of µ: More formally:
V (a;µ) =
8<: ¯µ+a1¡± if µ > µ (a)¡s + ±V if µ · µ (a)
9=;
64
where µ (a) =
8>><>>:
1 if (¡s+±V )(1¡±)¡a¯ ¸ 1
(¡s+±V )(1¡±)¡a
¯ if
(¡s+±V )(1¡±)¡a
¯ 2 (1 ¡ ";1)
1 ¡ " if (¡s+±V )(1¡±)¡a¯ · 1 ¡ "
9>>=>>;
If the observed …t level is large enough (µ > µ (a)), then it is optimal for partners to continue
together. On the contrary, when µ is lower than the trigger value µ (a), they separate and look
for new partners. As highlighted in expression (5.1), the larger s and a the less likely that
separation occurs.9 The e¤ect of search costs is straightforward. The larger the cost of looking
for new partners the lower the willingness to do so. The e¤ect of the invested assets is due to its
irreversible nature. Separating has an opportunity cost since partners give up the bene…ts that
the investment is going to generate. The larger a the costlier to separate. These arguments
imply that s and a are both sources of lock-in for the partners.
The value of an alliance when partners are about to choose a is:
V = max
a
¯E [µ] +a ¡ c
2
a2 + (5.2)
±
Ã
prob
¡
µ · µ (a)¢ (¡s + ±V ) + prob ¡µ > µ (a)¢ a + ¯E £µ=µ > µ (a)¤
1 ¡ ±
!
The function V is composed of two parts. The …rst is the current period expected pay-o¤
net of the investment costs. The second, displayed into brackets, is the pay-o¤ that partners
expect from next period on. From (5.1), they know that whenever the observed µ is lower than
the trigger value µ (a) ; then they will separate. On the contrary, for values of µ larger than
µ (a) ; the partnership will last forever.
Note that, V stays constant over time and, therefore, (5.1), (5.2) correctly de…ne the maxi-
mization problems faced a couple of …rms, if, at the end of each period, a continuum of alliances
chooses to separate. In this way, the probability of being re-matched with the current partner
is zero. This occurs provided that the following conditions hold:
² (A1): s <
³
(¡2(1¡±)+"(2¡±))¯
2(1¡±)
´
;
9This argument is some imprecise in that V depends on s and, therefore, it is not exogenous.
65
² (A2): c > ±¡¯"±2+2s±2+2¯±2+¯"±+¯" :
It would be easy to check that in case that either (A1) and/or (A2) are violated, then the
optimal investment is such that no alliance chooses to separate. When (A1) does not hold, then
search costs are so high that it is too costly to change partner. When it is (A2) not to hold,
then the cost of the investment is so low that a is the only relevant component of the pay-o¤.
Therefore, restricting the analysis to the cases in which both (A1) and (A2) are satis…ed means
getting rid of the situations in which µ and the inherent uncertainty plays no substantial role.10
Next proposition characterizes the equilibrium of the game under (A1) and (A2).11
Proposition 8 Assuming that (A1) and (A2) are satis…ed, then, at any period, the equilibrium
of the game is characterized by the following sequence of events:
i) at the beginning of the period, …rms match in couples and form alliances;
ii) each alliance chooses a¤ as de…ned in the appendix;
iii) at the end of the period, a continuum of i.i.d. random variables µ is realized and a
proportion equal to prob
¡
µ · µ (a¤)¢ has a value lower than µ (a¤) ;
iv) all the alliances with a µ larger than µ (a¤) continue together, while all the alliances with
a µ lower than µ (a¤) separate and the involved …rms restart the game.
Proposition 8 states that, in equilibrium, at each period, a proportion of alliances continues
together while another proportion separates. Firms involved in the alliances that separate
re-start the game, that is, they look for new partners.
In the following corollary, I qualify the e¤ect of " on the optimal investment.
Corollary 5 The optimal level of investment a¤is decreasing in ":
Corollary 5 points out that the larger the uncertainty over the …t level, the lower the
incentives to invest in an alliance. The intuition of this result is quite simple. The probability
10When (A1) and (A2) do not hold the optimal investment is 1c(1¡±) and no alliance ever separates. Therefore,
any of the partners’ choices is una¤ected by µ and ":
11Note that all alliances choosing a = 1c(1¡±) and none of them separating is another equilibrium. However,
under (A1) and (A2) one would get rid of this equilibrium just by assuming that at each period some new …rms
enter the pool of potential partners.
66
that µ turns out to be low increases with ": Therefore, when " is high the probability of
separation and, then, the probability of losing the alliance speci…c investment at the end of the
current period is large.
Corollary 6 stresses other two properties of a¤:
Corollary 6 The optimal level of investment a¤ is:
i) increasing in s;
ii) decreasing in ¯:
As mentioned when discussing (5.1), search costs lock partners into the alliance thus reducing
their willingness to separate. This fact implies that an high s stimulates large investments.
Indeed, with an high probability partners will stay together even after observing µ and the
invested assets will be productive beyond the current period (part i) of corollary 6).12 A small
¯ lowers the incentives to search new partners with a larger µ: Therefore, its e¤ect is that of
lowering the likelihood of separation. This implies that the willingness to invest in an alliance
enlarges as ¯ decreases (part ii) of corollary 6).
5.2.2 A Generalization of the Results
In the analysis made so far, I have neglected the fact that an increase in " does not only enlarge
uncertainty about µ but it also decreases its expected value. Thus, implicitly, I have assumed
that more uncertain contexts are also less pro…table ones. However, in this subsection, I prove
that this implicit assumption does not a¤ect the qualitative results of corollary 5. I assume
that the impact of the …t level on the pay-o¤ is a function of the level of "; that is, ¯ (") :
Considering the case in which ¯ (") is increasing, in more uncertain contexts the lower expect
value of µ is compensated by a larger ¯ (") : Therefore, when making comparative static analysis
with respect to " ,one would consider scenarios in which alliances have similar pro…tability. For
instance, when ¯ (") = 12¡" ; the expected value of the …t level for the alliance, E [¯ (") µ] ; is
equal to 12 independently of ":
12Rauch and Watson (1999) obtain an opposite result. That is, in their model, the larger the search costs the
more likely it is that …rms start small. This di¤erence in the results stems from the fact that in their set up the
investment is not productive but it is just a kind of ”entry fee” that has to be paid in order to run the large
project.
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For sake of generality, I also consider that the search costs might depend on "; that is, s (") :
In this case, the result that I obtain is the following:
Corollary 7 When ¯ (") and s (") are functions of "; the optimal level of investment a¤ de-
creases in " provided that:
H > 2G
@s (")
@"
¡ F @¯ (")
@"
; (5.3)
where F, G and H are positive expressions de…ned in the appendix.
Corollary 7 generalizes the results of corollary 5: in highly uncertain contexts …rms have a
lower willingness to invest in irreversible assets. Stated in words, condition (5.3) requires both
s (") to be “not too increasing” and ¯ (") to be “not too decreasing”: An intuition of why this
condition is required can be derived from corollary 6. As said, larger search costs lock partners
into the alliance thus increasing their willingness to invest. Therefore, search costs should
be “not too increasing” otherwise their e¤ect might compensate that of uncertainty. Similarly,
when ¯ (") is low partners have no incentives to look for better matches and this induces them to
invest more in the current alliance. Therefore, the requirement that ¯ (") is “not too decreasing”
is to limit the e¤ect of a lower value of searching. However, this is a mild assumption. Indeed,
as said above, if, on the contrary, ¯ (") is decreasing projects characterized by a larger " are
not only more uncertain, but also overall less pro…table. Therefore, making comparative static
analysis with respect to " would mean comparing inherently very di¤erent alliances. A more
“fair” comparison would be that of considering alliances of similar pro…tability.
An implication of the analysis above is:
Corollary 8 Assuming that condition (5.3) is satis…ed, the proportion of alliances that sepa-
rate, that is prob
¡
µ · µ (a¤)¢ ; increases with ":
This last result implies that, under the same conditions as in corollary 7, for projects
characterized by a larger " the turnover is more intense. This is due to two e¤ects that reinforce
each other. On the one hand, the probability of separating is per se increasing in ": Indeed,
think about the extreme case in which " = 0; then, in this situation, separation would never
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occur. On top of this, there is the investment e¤ect. The larger " the lower a¤ and therefore
the less partners are locked into the alliance.
5.3 Empirical Evidence
The main hypothesis that can be derived from the model is contained in corollary 5. In light of
what has been stressed by Chiesa and Manzini (1998) and Contractor and Lorange (1988), this
result can be interpreted in the following way: the larger " the less partners prefer to invest
in organization. Therefore, contexts in which uncertainty is supposed to be substantial are
expected to be dominated by Contractual Agreements rather than Joint Ventures.
In this section, I test this prediction using a database on alliances constructed at the Ka-
tolieke Universiteit of Leuven. A more accurate analysis is presented in the next chapter of this
thesis.
5.3.1 Description of the database
The data has been collected by recording the announcements of alliances’ formation as they
appeared in the Financial Times. Four years have been investigated, from 1993 to 1996, and,
overall, information about 1344 alliances has been recorded. Alliances are classi…ed according
to the governance form that partners chose: Joint Venture, when the agreement led to the
creation of a new …rm, Contractual Agreement, in the other cases. Moreover, a description of
the activities undertaken by the alliance is present. These are categorized into three groups:
R&D, production and distribution and marketing activities. In addition, a sectoral classi…cation
of both the activities of the alliance and the core businesses of the participating …rms is included.
These are based on the Nace codes at the 3-digits level.
5.3.2 Testing procedure
I test the hypothesis of the model considering two di¤erent variables. Firstly, I consider that "
relates to the typology of the project that the alliance undertakes. In this case, I check whether
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there is a signi…cant di¤erence across projects’ typologies and the proportion of Joint Ventures
and Contractual Agreements that partners have chosen. Secondly, focusing just on the alliances
that carry out R&D activities, I concentrate on the characteristics of the sector in which the
alliance takes place. In particular, I consider that " is related to the “level of sophistication”
of the sector. In this case, I test whether there is a signi…cant di¤erence across sectors and the
proportions of Joint Ventures and Contractual Agreements. In both cases I apply the Â2 test
of non-parametric statistic.
Type of activities carried out in the alliance
The database categorizes the activities undertaken by the alliances into three groups: R&D,
production and distribution and marketing. In this case, I test whether the proportions of Joint
Ventures and Contractual Agreements that have been established varies in a signi…cant way in
these three groups. In the analysis, I drop those alliances in which more than one activity was
simultaneously carried out and, obviously, those for which the type of activity was unknown.13
It is commonly accepted that R&D activities are characterized by an high level of un-
certainty. Consistently, I expect " to be higher for R&D alliances. Therefore, based on the
theoretical model, I expect the proportion of Contractual Agreements being signi…cantly larger
when R&D rather than production or distribution and marketing activities are carried out.
Table 1: Alliances classi…ed in terms of the activity undertaken
Joint Ventures Contractual Ag. Total
R&D activities 37 95 132
Production activities 415 164 579
Dist-Mark activities 96 105 201
Total 548 365 912
From Table 1 it is immediate to check that this is the case. When R&D activities are in
the agenda of the alliance, the number of Contractual Agreements (95) is nearly three times
13Overall, there are 381 alliances that carried out at least two between R&D, production and distribution and
marketing activities. Moreover, for 51 alliances there was no information about the type of activity.
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that of Joint Ventures (37). The contrary is true in case the alliance is formed to carry out
production activities. At an intermediate place rests the case of distribution and marketing
activities. Obviously the Â2 test con…rms this di¤erence. The null hypothesis is that the relative
proportion of Joint Ventures and Contractual Agreements do not vary across the three categories
in a signi…cant way. The value of the test is 101:7 which means that the null hypothesis can be
rejected with 99:5% con…dence.
However, some caution should be used when interpreting these results. Indeed, even if the
di¤erence among R&D, production and distribution and marketing is evident, this might not
only be caused by the argument given in the theoretical model. On the one hand, other factors
could play a primary role. As an example, production alliances could require to set up a new
plant and this might be more easily managed through a Joint Venture. On the other hand, as
said in the introduction, that about the …t level is not the only source of uncertainty for the
partners. Therefore, one should keep in mind that also other sources of uncertainty might be
important determinants of the empirical …nding.
Level of sophistication of the sector
The second exercise I want to perform is that of relating some features of the sector in which
the alliance takes place to the form of governance. As said in the introduction, in a series of
empirical studies it has been shown that Contractual Agreements tend to prevail in high tech
sectors, while Joint Ventures in more mature ones. High tech or sophisticated are considered
those sectors for which the ratio R&D expenditures to sales is high relative to the others.
The intuition derived from the model I have presented goes in the direction of con…rming
this empirical …nding. High tech sectors are typically those in which …rms having “distinct
backgrounds” and endowed with very di¤erent capabilities ally. As Hagedoorn (1993) stresses
“Here it is the growing interrelationship between ... computer science and process technologies;
material science, electronics and chemistry ...”. Therefore, uncertainty over the …t level should
be at its maximum levels (i.e. " should be largest) when the alliance takes place in high tech
sectors.
To test the hypothesis that Contractual Agreements are signi…cantly more present in high
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tech industries, I restrict the attention to R&D alliances and I classify them in high, mid and
low tech using the same classi…cation as in Hagedoorn and Duyster (1999).14 In high tech I
include those alliances whose 3-digits Nace codes belong to sectors characterized by the largest
levels of the R&D to sales ratio.
Table 2: R&D alliances classi…ed in terms of the level of sophistication of the sector
Joint Ventures Contractual Ag. Total
High-tech 15 61 76
Mid-tech 11 26 37
Low-tech 11 8 19
Total 37 95 132
As one can check from Table 2, the prevalence of Contractual Agreements is clear in case
of high tech sectors, while in low tech sectors there is a slight prevalence of Joint Venture. The
Â2 square test con…rms that there is a signi…cant di¤erence between the three groups. The
value of the test is 11:04 which implies that the null hypothesis (the proportion between Joint
Ventures and Contractual Agreements does not vary signi…cantly among the three groups) can
be rejected with 99:5% con…dence.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have considered a stylized model of alliance formation in a context in which
…rms are uncertain about their technological or organizational …t level. Partners decide about
two things. Firstly, they decide how many assets to invest. Secondly, once they have learned
their …t level they decide whether to continue together or to separate. I have proved that the
larger the uncertainty the lower the incentives to invest in the alliance. I interpret this result
in terms of the governance form that partners choose for their alliance. Therefore, I expect
that the larger the uncertainty the more …rms prefer kinds of agreements that require lower
levels of commitment. In the last part of the paper, I have tested the main prediction of the
theoretical model using a database on alliances created at the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven.
14See appendix for more details.
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In particular, I have concentrated on two variables: the typology of project that the alliance
undertakes and the characteristics of the sector in which this takes place. The empirical …ndings
give a …rst and rough support to the prediction of the model. In cases in which uncertainty is
likely to be large, partners have a stronger preference towards governance forms that require
less commitment.
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5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 8.
I characterize the equilibrium of the game for the general case in which ¯ (") and s (") are
functions of ": Consider the optimal behavior of an alliance. Using backward induction:
iv) suppose that all the other alliances have invested a while the alliance under consideration
has invested a0 with a0 possibly di¤erent from a: If µ (a) < (1 ¡ ") ; then no other alliance
separates and therefore neither the one under consideration will. If µ (a) ¸ (1 ¡ ") ; then (by
iii)) a proportion prob
¡
µ < µ (a)
¢
of alliances has …t level lower than µ (a) : In equilibrium all
these alliances separate. If the alliance under consideration separates then the involved partners
will face a continuum of potential partners. Therefore, for each partner the value of dismissing
the alliance is 12 (¡s (") + ±V ) and they will do it i¤ µ < µ (a0) ;
iii) given that all the …t levels are i.i.d. random variables, then the law of large numbers
applies. When all the alliances have invested the same a; then a proportion prob
¡
µ · µ (a)¢
have a …t level lower than µ (a) ;
ii) in equilibrium all the other alliances invest the optimal a; a¤: Therefore, the alliance under
consideration knows that at the end of this period a continuum of partnerships will be dismissed
(a proportion prob
¡
µ · µ (a¤)¢) so that (5.2) correctly de…nes its maximization problem. To
characterize a¤ recall that: E [µ] = 2¡"2 ; prob
¡
µ · µ (a)¢ = µ(a)¡(1¡")" ; E £µnµ ¸ µ (a)¤ = 1+µ(a)2 :
For the probabilities to be well de…ned a has to belong to the interval
((¡s (") + ±V ) (1 ¡ ±) ¡¯ (") ; (¡s + ±V ) (1 ¡ ±) ¡ (1 ¡ ")¯ (")) : I …rst compute the opti-
mal a and then check that indeed it belongs to the above interval.
The F.O.C of the maximization problem shown in (5.2) de…ne the optimal a given V: That
is, a (V ) = ¯(")"¡¯(")"±+s(")±¡s±
2+±¯(")¡±2(1¡±)V
c¯(")"(1¡±)¡± : Conditions (A1) and (A2) assure the concavity
of the problem. Using a (V ) ; the optimal value of V becomes:
V ¤ = ¡s(")±
3c+c¯(")±2+s(")±2c¡c¯(")"±2¡±+c¯(")"¡pA
c±3(1¡±) ; where
A ´ c2¯ (")2 "2 + ±2 + 2s (") ±2c2¯ (") " +2c2¯ (")2 ±2" ¡ 2s (") ±3c2¯ (") "
+c2±3¯ (")2 "2¡2c2¯ (")2 "2±2¡2c2±3¯ (")2 "¡2c¯ (") "±¡ 2c¯ (") ±3¡2s (") ±3c+c¯ (") "±3:
and A it is positive by conditions (A1) and (A2). Substituting V ¤ in a (V ) it is possible to
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de…ne the optimal investment level: a¤ = ¡ 1c± +
p
A
c±(c¯(")"(1¡±)¡±) : Using (A1) and (A2) one can
check that indeed
a¤ 2 ((¡s (") + ±V ) (1 ¡ ±) ¡¯ (") ; (¡s (") + ±V ) (1 ¡ ±) ¡ (1 ¡ ")¯ (")) :Q:E:D:
Proof of Corollary 5, 6, 7
Di¤erentiating a¤ with respect to " :
@a¤
@" =
µ
¡±2 F
@¯(")
@" ¡2G @s(")@" +H
G
p
A
¶
where:
F ´ (2" + ± (2 ¡ ") +2"s (") c (1 ¡ ±))
G ´ (c¯ (") " (1 ¡ ±) ¡ ±)
H ´ ¯ (") (2c (1 ¡ ±) (s (") +¯ (")) + (2 ¡ ±))
Note that F , G and H are positive under (A1) and (A2) and, therefore, @a
¤
@" < 0 under the
condition highlighted in corollary 2. This proves corollary 7.
When s (") = s and ¯ (") = ¯; then simple di¤erentiation of a¤; leads to:
- @a
¤
@" =
³
¡±2 HGpA
´
< 0;
- @a¤@s =
±p
A
> 0;
- @a¤@¯ = ¡ F±2GpA < 0:
therefore, corollaries 5 and 7 are demonstrated.Q:E:D:
Proof of Corollary 8
- @(prob(µ<µ(a
¤)))
@" =
@
³
1
±¡(1¡±)c± a¤
´
@" > 0:
this derivative is negative by the previous proof.Q:E:D:
5.5.2 Industry Classi…cation
Industry classi…cation in high, mid, low tech. Table taken from Hagedoorn and Duyster (1999);
the classi…cation is based on a comparison of the R&D expenditures to sales ratio at the
industry level. Data from OECD 1997 “Revision of the high technology sector and product
classi…cation”, Paris, OECD.
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Table 3: industry classi…cation
Industry
High tech
Drugs
Information technology
Aerospace / Defense
Mid tech
Instrumentation
Automotive
Chemicals17/ Plastics
Low tech
Food and beverages
Metals
Oil and Gas
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Chapter 6
The Governance Form of Strategic
Alliances: an Empirical Analysis1
6.1 Introduction
In this concluding chapter, I present an empirical analysis of the issue of the governance form
of strategic alliances. This part of the thesis is largely based on Comino, Mariel and Sandonís
(2001). The objective of this assessment is that of testing the main hypotheses that have been
put forward by the economic literature as well as some of the predictions that can be derived
from the theoretical models of chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. In the analysis, a database on
strategic alliances that has been created at the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven is employed.
As said when introducing the topic, the studies that deal with the governance form of
strategic alliances have been mainly inspired by the approach of the Transaction Costs Theory.
Similarly, a series of empirical papers has tested its principal predictions. In Table 1, there is a
list of three of the most known and remarkable among these empirical studies, namely Gulati
(1995), Pisano (1989) and Osborn and Baughn (1990). In the table, the principal explanatory
variables that have been used, their statistical signi…cance and their e¤ect on the probability
that the alliance takes the form of a Joint Venture rather than a Contractual Agreement are
1I acknowledge Reinhilde Veugelers and the project FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katolieke
Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database.
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listed.2 The sign (+) means that the variable increases the likelihood of a Joint Venture, while
the sign (¡) that it decreases it.
Table 1: List of three empirical studies on the governance form of alliances
Gulati Pisano Osborn and Baughn
R&D
(+)
(**) signi…cant
(+)
(**) signi…cant
(+)
(**) signi…cant
INTERNATIONAL
(+)
(**) signi…cant not signi…cant
RIVAL
not signi…cant
HIGH TECH
(-)
(**) signi…cant
SIZE
not signi…cant
>2 PARTNERS
not signi…cant
REPEATED TIES
(-)
(**) signi…cant
(**) signi…cance at p<0.01
The only variable we have not been able to replicate in Comino, Mariel and Sandonís (2001)
is REPEATED TIES. This variable counts the number of previous alliances among the partners.
According to Gulati (1995), repeated alliances among the same …rms favor the emergence of
trust thus reducing the fear of opportunistic behavior. Therefore, the author expects (and
empirically tests) that previous alliances favor Contractual Agreements over Joint Ventures.
2Gulati (1995) uses a Logit model, Pisano (1989) a Probit model, while Osborn and Baughn (1990) a dis-
criminant function model.
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The other variables included in Table 1 are the same as the ones we use. Their description
and expected e¤ect are explained below.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, there is a description of the database.
In section 3, the principal hypotheses to test are listed. Section 4 describes the method and
the variables used in the analysis. The results are presented in section 5, while the concluding
remarks in section 6.
6.2 The Database
The database used in the analysis is the one created at the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven.
In chapter 5, I have pointed out its principal characteristics.
6.3 Testable Conjectures
The main testable hypothesis one can derive from the theoretical model presented in chapter
4 relates the governance form to the absorptive capacities of the partners. In particular, the
more asymmetric these latter are the riskier to select a Contractual Agreement. Based on
this observation, one would expect Joint Ventures to be more likely to be observed the more
asymmetric partners’ absorptive capacities are. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to test
this hypothesis. Indeed, no good proxy for the absorptive capacity was available. Natural
candidates were the number of patents3 or the R&D expenditures of each partner,4 but this
information was available only for few and huge companies. An attempt has been made by using
the …rms’ sizes (measured by the number of employees) as proxies for their absorptive capacities.
However, when including this variable, the results were not encouraging. In particular, the size
variable was not signi…cant. Several could be the reasons of these poor results. The size of the
…rm could be not a good approximation of its absorptive capacity. Moreover, the number of
observations included in the regressions when using this variable was limited. Indeed, only for
3In their empirical analysis, Hagedoorn and Duyster (1999) use the number of patents of a …rm as a proxy
for the regime of appropriability. The variable turns out to be non signi…cant. However, the authors still think
that this variable plays an important role and that, possibly, the proxy was not good enough.
4Several studies stress that the capacity of a …rm to absorb knowledge is closely related to its expenditures
in R&D. On this point, see Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Kamien and Zang (2000).
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98 alliances information about the …rms’ sizes was available.5
The main result of the model of chapter 5 implies that the typology of the project that
partners are pursuing as well as the characteristics of the sector in which the alliance takes
place are important determinants of the governance form. With reference to the …rst point, we
expect that the larger the uncertainty that characterizes a project, the more likely that partners
choose a Contractual Agreement. In particular, given that R&D activities are intrinsically more
uncertain than production or distribution and marketing ones, it is expected that:
Conjecture 1 Alliances carrying out R&D activities are less likely to be organized as Joint
Ventures.
In other words, we expect that the presence of R&D activities in the agenda of the alliance
reduces the probability that partners choose to structure it as a Joint Venture. It is important
to point out that in other empirical papers the opposite conjecture has been made. The authors
of these studies interpret R&D activities as proxies for transaction costs.6 That is, the large
uncertainty that characterizes these activities makes it more di¢cult to write binding contracts
and, therefore, the possibilities of opportunistic behavior of the partners are enhanced. As a
consequence, in these studies it is predicted that R&D alliances are more likely to be equity
based.
The other implication that can be derived from the model of chapter 5 is that in high tech
sectors there is a signi…cantly stronger preference towards Contractual Agreements. As said,
it is custom to de…ne high tech those sectors in which the ratio R&D expenditures to sales is
particularly high.7 To isolate the e¤ect of the characteristics of the sector in which the alliance
takes place, we concentrate on those alliances that pursue R&D projects. The conjecture we
want to test is:
5In the original database no information on …rms’ sizes was included and, therefore, other sources were looked
for. However, to use a variable that measures …rms’ asymmetry, it was necessary to …nd information about the
size of all the partners involved in an alliance. This happened to be possible only in a limited number (98) of
cases.
6See Gulati (1995), Osborn and Baughn (1990) and Pisano (1989).
7On this point see Hagedoorn and Duyster (1999), Osborn and Baughn and Auster (1992).
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Conjecture 2 Alliances taking place in high tech sectors are less likely to be organized as Joint
Ventures.
According to Pastor and Sandonís (2001) the fact that partners are or are not rivals plays a
decisive role when choosing the form of governance. As commonly claimed, these authors assume
that Joint Ventures are better vehicles to absorb the partner’s know-how. Indeed, working
together in a common structure favors the ‡ow of information between partners. However,
when they are rivals in an independent market8 the possibility that the partner learns one’s
capabilities and, therefore, that it becomes a stronger competitor has detrimental e¤ects on the
willingness to reveal know-how. Thus, in these instances, a Contractual Agreement might be
superior.9 Based on this argument we expect that:
Conjecture 3 Alliances between rival …rms are less likely to be organized as Joint Ventures.
The larger the number of partners involved in an alliance, the more di¢cult to monitor each
other’s behavior. Moreover, as Gulati (1995) says “...the presence of more than two partners
heightens the possibility of stalemates and con‡icts”. Therefore, when the number of involved
…rms is greater than two the possibilities of opportunistic behavior and of con‡icts among
partners are enhanced and therefore we predict that:10
Conjecture 4 Alliances with more than two partners are more likely to be organized as Joint
Ventures
According to the Transaction Costs Theory alliances involving partners coming from di¤er-
ent countries are more likely to be characterized by large transaction costs. Firms may trust
8These authors consider the case in which partners are rivals in a market that is di¤erent and independent
from the one in which the fruits of the joint project will be used.
9One needs to stress that the conclusion reached by Tao and Wu (1997) when analyzing the e¤ect of rivalry
between partners is opposite to the one of Pastor and Sandonís (2001). However, Tao and Wu do not analyze the
case in which partners compete in an independent market but they consider rivalry in the use of the innovation
obtained in the alliance. In their case, the Joint Venture works as a collusive devise. Indeed, with a Contractual
Agreements, each partner freely uses the innovation and the total pay-o¤ they obtain is spoiled by competition.
In a Joint Venture, partners have to pay a royalty to use the innovation. The royalty is set at a level such that
only one of the two partners buys and uses it. In this way, the total pay-o¤ is not reduced because of competition.
10The same conjecture is made by Gulati (1995).
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more domestic partners and also the information available should be better for companies com-
ing from the same nation. Therefore, the expected costs due to the opportunistic behavior of
the partner are larger in case of international alliances. To take into account this e¤ect, we
employ a dummy variable that equals 1 when partners are coming from di¤erent countries.
This variable has been used in many empirical studies and the expected e¤ect is the following:
Conjecture 5 International alliances are more likely to be organized as Joint Ventures.
6.4 Methodology and Variables
We use a Probit model to the test the e¤ect of various independent variables on the probability
that the alliance is organized as a Joint Venture. That is, the unit of observation is the alliance
and the dependent variable is the form of governance. This variable is equal to 1 in case partners
have chosen a Joint Venture, while it is 0 in case of a Contractual Agreement.
Following the discussion made above we have included several variables as determinants of
the organizational form of the alliance. In particular:
² R&D: dummy variable that is equal to 1 when some R&D activities are carried out in the
alliance;
² PRODUCTION: dummy variable that takes the value 1 when some production activities
are carried out in the alliance;
² RIVAL: dummy variable that is equal to 1 if at least two partners are rivals. Rivalry is
de…ned on the basis of the Nace codes and two …rms are considered as rivals when the
3-digits codes of their core businesses coincide;
² INTERNATIONAL: dummy variable that takes the value 1 if all the partners are coming
from a di¤erent country;
² HIGH TECH: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the alliance takes place in an high
tech sector;11
11See chapter 5 for a description of this variable as well as for MID TECH.
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² MID TECH: dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the alliance takes place in a mid tech
sector;
² >2 PARTNERS: dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever more than two partners
are involved in the alliance.
6.5 The Results
Firstly, we consider the complete set of alliances, that is 1344. For some observations some
values are missing so that the …nal set is composed of 1216 alliances. The main results are
listed in Table 2:
85
Table 2: Probit estimations using all the alliances; dependent variable the governance form (1 if Joint Venture)
Variables
Model 1
Coe¢cient and (t-statistic)
Model 2
Coe¢cient and (t-statistic)
CONSTANT
-0.267
(-2.371)¤¤
-0.267
(-2.681)¤¤
R&D
-0.438
(-4.932)¤¤
-0.439
(-4.939)¤¤
PRODUCTION
0.659
(7.648)¤¤
0.659
(7.646)¤¤
RIVAL
-0.201
(-2.602)¤¤
-0.204
(-2.681)¤¤
INTERNATIONAL
0.352
(3.800)¤¤
0.352
(3.795)¤¤
>2 PARTNERS
-0.233
(-0.193)
Number of obs. 1216 1216
Â2 132.45 132.41
Pseudo R2 0.081 0.081
Log likelihood -751.586 -751.605
(**) signi…cance at p<0.01
(*) signi…cance at p<0.05
One can check that the conjectures 1,3 and 5 are con…rmed, while conjecture 4 is not. In
particular, the fact that the alliance undertakes an R&D project decreases the likelihood of
a Joint Venture. This result is quite robust in statistical terms. Moreover, also performing
analyses for subgroups (e.g. considering separately alliances in high, mid or low tech sectors)
the result was con…rmed. However, some caution is needed when interpreting it. In stating
conjecture 1, we claimed that one possible explanation is related to the uncertainty that char-
acterizes R&D projects. That is, when uncertainty is large, then partners prefer arrangements
that require to commit to a lesser extent. However, some other factors may play an impor-
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tant role. For instance, production and distribution and marketing activities may require the
construction of new plants or distribution facilities and these might be more easily managed
through a Joint Venture. Therefore, if this were the case, in comparative terms, a Contractual
Agreement would be better suited to R&D alliances rather than to production and distribution
and marketing ones. Moreover, the uncertainty that characterizes an R&D project does not
only depend on the unknown …t level between partners (as pointed out in chapter 5) but also
it is an intrinsic characteristic of this kind of activities.
On the contrary, in Table 2, it is found that production alliances are more likely to be
organized as Joint Ventures.12 Furthermore, consistently with conjecture 3, rival …rms prefer
to organize their ventures as a Contractual Agreements. Following the prediction of Pastor
and Sandonís (2001), this means that rivals prefer to keep their businesses separated so that
to minimize the risk of unintended informational leakages. The variable >2 PARTNERS does
not appear to be statistically signi…cant. Therefore, conjecture 4 is not supported by empirical
evidence. One possible justi…cation for this result is that the large majority (around 90%) of the
alliances is between two partners so that the number of observations with more than two …rms
involved in the alliance is rather limited. Lastly, when the alliance is between …rms coming
from di¤erent countries, then it is more likely that it is in the form of a Joint Venture.
To concentrate on the e¤ect of the characteristics of the sector in which the alliance takes
place, we consider subgroups of the initial set of alliances. In particular, here I present the results
obtained when considering R&D alliances, that is, alliances that are undertaking Research
and Development projects. Indeed, the argument of chapter 5 that is behind conjecture 4
is particularly suited for R&D activities in high tech sectors. It is in these instances that
companies endowed with very di¤erent capabilities join their forces. The main results when
considering R&D alliances are represented in Table 3.
12Recall that in the database alliances are classi…ed in three groups according to the activities they carry out:
R&D, production and distribution and marketing. Therefore, in Table 2, the reference group is distribution and
marketing.
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Table 3: Probit estimations using R&D alliances; dependent variable the governance form (1 if Joint Venture)
Variables
Model 1
Coe¢cient and (t-statistic)
Model 2
Coe¢cient and (t-statistic)
CONSTANT
0.172
(0.623)
0.197
(0.735)
HIGH TECH
-0.767
(-3.142)¤¤
-0.767
(-3.141)¤¤
MID TECH
-0.579
(-2.245)¤¤
-0.582
(-2.259)¤¤
INTERNATIONAL
0.338
(1.919)
0.343
(1.956)¤
>2 PARTNERS
-0.394
(-1.677)
-0.379
(-1.634)
RIVAL
0.593
(0.397)
Number of obs. 306 306
Â2 16.81 16.66
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.040
Log likelihood -199.593 -199.672
(**) signi…cance at p<0.01
(*) signi…cance at p<0.05
The variables HIGH TECH and MID TECH have the expected sign13 and are statistically
signi…cant. Therefore, we found evidence that in developing sectors there is a signi…cantly
larger presence of Contractual Agreements. This result held even when estimating the model
for the pool of production alliances (i.e. when concentrating the analysis on the alliances that
carried out production rather than R&D activities), while it was less clear for the distribution
13Note that the sectors in which the alliances take place are classi…ed as high, mid and low tech. Therefore,
in Table 3, the reference group is that of the alliances active in low tech sectors.
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and marketing one.14 Comparing the results of Table 3 with those of Table 2, one can check
that INTERNATIONAL keeps its correct sign even if its statistical signi…cance has decreased.
Considering the pool of production alliances, the variable was signi…cant at a level p < 0:01;
while it was not when considering distribution and marketing alliances. Contrarily to the
previous analysis RIVAL is not signi…cant. The same happened in case of distribution and
marketing alliances,15 while it was signi…cant and with the expected negative sign for the pool
of production alliances. In Table 3, >2 PARTNERS is nearly signi…cant; however, its sign
is opposite to the one predicted in conjecture 4. Moreover, when considering either the pool
of production or that of distribution and marketing alliances >2 PARTNERS was highly non
signi…cant.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
The objective of this last chapter of the thesis has been that of empirically testing the principal
predictions of the economic literature dealing with the issue of the governance form of strategic
alliances as well as some of the hypotheses that can be derived from the models of chapters 4
and 5. The analysis is based on Comino, Mariel and Sandonís (2001) and the database that
has been employed is that created at the Katolieke Universiteit of Leuven. In the analysis, we
have found evidence that the presence of R&D activities makes it more likely that the alliance
is organized as a Contractual Agreement rather than as a Joint Venture. The explanation
that we give to this result is that the uncertainty that characterizes these kind of activities
induces …rms to choose more ‡exible types of agreements that require to commit to a lesser
extent. Moreover, also when …rm are rivals they prefer Contractual Agreements. They do so
in order to “keep their businesses separated” thus avoiding unintended informational leakages.
International alliances tend to be in the form of Joint Venture. Contrarily to what predicted by
the theory, no role seems to play the number of participants to the venture. Relating governance
form to the characteristics of the sector in which the alliance takes place, we have found evidence
that in highly sophisticated sectors …rms tend to prefer Contractual Agreements. Again, the
14In this case the variable MID TECH was not statistically signi…cant while HIGH TECH had a t-statistic of
1.59.
15In this case the associated t-statistic is 1.2.
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explanation we give to this result is that when partners face highly uncertain contexts they
prefer more ‡exible forms of cooperation.
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